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Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes
of Identity Politics
William N. Eskridge, Jr.t
A Houston neighbor of John Geddes Lawrence complained
to the Harris County sheriff's office that a suspicious black man
had entered Lawrence's apartment.! Jumping to the conclusion
that the man was a burglar, the sheriffs office swiftly dis-
patched a team of police to Lawrence's apartment. The officers
entered the apartment, where they found Lawrence and Tyron
Garner, the alleged "burglar," engaged in consensual anal sex.
The shocked officers arrested the couple, humiliated them, and
jailed them for twenty-four hours. By these petty actions, Har-
ris County handed Lambda Legal Education and Defense Fund
the case everyone supporting gay rights had been waiting for-
the application of a state sodomy law to intercourse by consent-
ing adults within the home.
The precise result of these police shenanigans was litiga-
tion challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law, which makes it a misdemeanor for two consent-
ing adults to commit "deviate sexual intercourse," but only if
the two adults are of the same sex.2 The Texas courts denied
t John A. Garver Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Author of Brief of
the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). I greatly profited from presenting
earlier drafts of this Article at the University of Minnesota and N.Y.U. Law
Schools. Particularly useful were written comments from, and extended con-
versations with, Amy Adler, Barry Adler, Suzanne Bryant, Dan Farber, Elea-
nor Fox, Barry Friedman, Larry Kramer, Sylvia Law, Miranda Oshige
McGowan, David McGowan, Bill Nelson, and Mark Tushnet.
1. The statement of facts is taken from the Respondent's Brief, Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). See also Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001), reu'd sub nom. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (declared unconstitutional
by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined to include
both oral and anal sex. Id. § 21.01(1). Deviate sexual intercourse between two
people of different sexes was completely legal in Texas so long as they were
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Lawrence and Garner's constitutional challenge, and the U.S.
Supreme Court took review in Lawrence v. Texas.3
As had been widely expected among legal experts, the
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,4 a 1986 decision which
had rejected right to privacy challenges to Georgia's consensual
sodomy law.5 No one, however, anticipated the breadth of the
Court's opinion. Scholars had exposed historical as well as logi-
cal problems with Justice Byron White's surly opinion in
Hardwick. Writing for five Justices in Lawrence, Justice Ken-
nedy explored those flaws and duly noted that American courts,
as well as commentators from a variety of perspectives, had
overwhelmingly disapproved of Hardwick (almost unheard-of in
our system).6 Courts in Europe had also rejected Hardwick's
understanding of personal privacy.7 More surprisingly, how-
ever, Justice Kennedy announced that the disrespect shown to
the lives and liberties of gay people was the greatest flaw of
Hardwick. By treating gay people as presumptive outlaws
rather than as citizens, Hardwick was wrong the day it was de-
cided.' The Supreme Court almost never says that. Most sur-
prisingly, Kennedy's opinion emphasized the ways in which
Hardwick had been deployed to deprive gay people of an array
of rights and freedoms.9 His assumption was that gay people
presumptively deserve to be treated as equal citizens and not
as outlaws.
Concurring in the Court's judgment, but not in overruling
Hardwick, Justice O'Connor relied on the Equal Protection
Clause as her basis for invalidating the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law."° Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Tho-
mas, Justice Scalia vigorously dissented." These concurring
and dissenting opinions raise a number of serious questions
about the Court's holding and its reasoning.
History. The Due Process Clause gives special protection to
both adults, both consented, and it occurred within the home or another pri-
vate place.
3. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (2003).
5. Id. at 196.
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480-83.
7. Id. at 2483.
8. Id. at 2478, 2484-86.
9. Id. at 2482.
10. Id. at 2484-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. Id. at 2488-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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liberties traditionally recognized as beyond the state's regula-
tion. The Court in Lawrence protected a liberty interest that
Hardwick had found "facetious" in light of historic Anglo-
American criminalization of sodomy. Can Lawrence's liberty in-
terest be squared with the history of state sodomy regulation?
With the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Does Lawrence reflect a new approach to sub-
stantive due process protection?
12
Stare Decisis. Justice Scalia's dissent accused the Court of
playing fast and loose with stare decisis, the presumptive re-
spect that the Court's precedents are supposed to enjoy. Can
Lawrence be squared with principles of stare decisis? Relevant
to that inquiry is the fact that the Court could have struck
down the Texas sodomy law on the ground that it violated the
equal protection of "homosexuals," as Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion urged. Instead, the Court took the broader
path, overruling Hardwick. Why did the Court go out of its way
to overrule a leading constitutional precedent, when an excel-
lent but narrower ground presented itself?3
Countermajoritarian Judicial Activism. The dissenters
suggested that the Court's decision was contrary to both history
and precedent-making the decision lawless. They also sug-
gested that it was undemocratic. The Court not only nullified
the Texas statute, but also nullified consensual sodomy laws in
thirteen other states: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia." If, as the Court
seemed to think, such laws are outdated legal relics, should the
Court not have left them to state legislative processes to re-
peal? Such a broad, and arguably unnecessary, ruling exposes
the countermajoritarian nature of the Court's exercise of power.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West
1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505
(1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.158 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (2000); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 566.090 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 886 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (West 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-403 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996); see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET app. at 362-71 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] (outlining
state and federal statutes discriminating on the basis of sexual or gender
variation).
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Can this be defended under democratic premises?1 5
The End of Morals Legislation? Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion sounded an alarm that Lawrence means the end of
state morals legislation-including laws criminalizing incest,
fornication, bestiality, adultery, etc. Thus, the assertedly law-
less and undemocratic nature of the Court's decision is not lim-
ited just to sodomy laws; all morals laws are now in play, the
dissenters maintained. To sweep them away in their entirety
would be a dramatically undemocratic display of judicial activ-
ism. To leave some in place (ultimately) would involve line-
16drawing best left to the democratic process.
Complete Homo Equality? The dissent went much further
in its accusations. Justice Scalia also claimed that the majority
was, in essence, adopting the entire "homosexual agenda."
Hence, Lawrence spells finis for the armed forces' exclusion of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals and requires states to recog-
nize same-sex marriages. Many gay people agree with the dis-
sent-the Constitution does require states to recognize same-
sex unions and does require the federal government to allow
openly gay people to serve in the armed forces. Most Americans
still do not support full homo equality, however. For some, full
equality for gays would be identity shattering. Can the judici-
ary foist the entire gay rights program on an unwilling Amer-
ica?
17
What Is Motivating the Justices? Perhaps the biggest mys-
tery of all is the only one the dissenters failed to mention: What
is motivating the majority Justices? At the very least, there
was much play in the history and the precedents, but the fact
remains that a majority of the Justices serving on the very con-
servative Rehnquist Court rejected the main legal authority on
point (Hardwick) when it ruled that states cannot criminalize
private consensual sodomy. Why would these jurists go out of
their way to discover constitutional rights for gay people, and
with soaring rhetoric found only in a handful of Supreme Court
decisions? It is implausible to think, as Justice Scalia suggests,
that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are moles for homo equal-
ity. But then what explains their boldness?'
This Article shall answer these questions, starting with the
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part V.
17. See discussion infra Part VI.
18. See discussion infra Parts I & IV.
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last one and then considering each of the foregoing questions
from the beginning. The key to understanding Lawrence-and
all its doctrinal complexities-is the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that American democratic pluralism must meet the les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights move-
ment at least halfway. After a century of discrimination and
persecution, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals have demon-
strated through their lives that traditional state antigay dis-
crimination and persecution were unjust. Through their politi-
cal activism, these Americans have claimed the right to be
considered equal citizens and not presumptive outlaws. They
have asserted that they can no longer be denigrated in public
discourse-and that a Supreme Court that denigrates them is a
Court wounding itself as well as America. But contrary to the
dissenters, Lawrence only sets a new floor for gay people, and
not the same floor that straight Americans can take for
granted. Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing
more than, a jurisprudence of tolerance. This means that tradi-
tionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay people or
render them presumptive criminals, but room remains for the
state to signal the majority's preference for heterosexuality,
marriage, and traditional family values.
The jurisprudence of tolerance is a conservative theory of
judicial review, and it is the theory that best justifies, and per-
haps inspires, the positions taken by the Court in Lawrence
and other recent gay rights cases. Ironically, it is a theory that
justifies a fair amount of activist judicial review-not just the
invalidation of consensual sodomy laws in Lawrence, but also
the Court's ruling that a sexual orientation antidiscrimination
law could not constitutionally be applied to require the Boy
Scouts to retain an openly gay scoutmaster. 9 What the cases
share is the Court's commitment to lowering the stakes of iden-
tity politics. The LGBT social movement wants to persuade
America that gay is good, while the traditional family values
(TFV) countermovement wants to persuade America that many
gay rights would undermine the family, marriage, and other
cherished institutions. This is a fine debate for America to
have. The Court is simply insisting that the players not hit be-
low the belt and turn a fair fight into a brawl.
The flip side of the jurisprudence of tolerance is that there
are limits to the Court's activism. Even progay Justices realize
19. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
2004] 1025
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that a Court that can insist on tolerance cannot insist on accep-
tance if the country is not willing to go along. Contrary to the
Lawrence dissent, the Rehnquist Court will not, anytime soon,
impose same-sex marriage on unwilling states, at least in part
because such a ruling would raise the stakes of politics in this
culture clash. Instead, the Court's strategy is to defer the most
divisive issues to other parts of our federal system: Individual
states will be left to struggle with the issue of same-sex mar-
riage, and the national legislature and executive will continue
to deliberate the armed forces' exclusion of LGBT people. But
the Court will remain as a productive referee for other funda-
mental antigay discriminations, including some that remain in
state criminal, family, and employment law.
I. LAWRENCE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
AND REGIME SHIFTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Supreme Court is responsive to the constitutional poli-
tics of social movements. In earlier work, I have identified the
way the process of mutual influence developed between the
Court and the great identity-based social movements of the
twentieth century.20 The civil rights movement is the exemplar.
American law systematically disadvantaged citizens based
upon their race and ethnicity. The various forms of legal dis-
crimination, and the violence associated with them, ensured
that people of color would be second-class citizens. During the
twentieth century, a steadily increasing number of such people
objected to this discrimination and cooperated in a mass social
movement for their civil rights.2
At first, normative civil-rights politics focused on the most
immediate physical aggressions of the state against African-
Americans. Thus, the NAACP's politics of protection main-
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitu-
tional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Eskridge, Twentieth Century].
21. Classic accounts include DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (1986); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1976); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For a
shorter and more popular account, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY
COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY 1890-2000 (2001).
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tained that racial variation did not justify state brutalization of
people of color through the criminal process and police miscon-
duct. This politics found expression in the protections of the
Due Process Clause, which the NAACP persuaded even conser-
vative Justices to construe to provide a national code of crimi-
nal procedure to protect citizens from police brutality and abu-
sive arrest and prosecution. Once black people made some
progress on the protection front, and energized more people of
all colors to support equal rights, the movement's politics ex-
panded. The NAACP's politics of recognition came front and
center in the 1940s, when its litigating arm, the Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. (Inc. Fund), took aim at apartheid,
the system of interlocking discriminations and exclusions that
defined people of color as second-class citizens.22 This politics
found expression in the Equal Protection Clause. Brown v.
Board of Education24 and subsequent cases illustrate the Su-
preme Court's acceptance of the NAACP's recognition politics.
Once the main de jure exclusions had been swept away, the
civil rights movement shifted toward a serious politics of reme-
diation, focused mostly in the political process.
Why did the Supreme Court substantially accept the con-
stitutional politics of the civil rights movement in the twentieth
century? One way of thinking about this question is to consider
the strategies that social movement deployed to motivate
judges to decide cases in their favor. Naive strategies assumed
that judges would (more or less) neutrally apply the law and
sought to present an expanded factual and normative context
within which even a skeptical but open-minded judge would
feel logically compelled to recognize the rights of a minority
within the governing legal or constitutional framework. Thus,
in dozens of criminal procedure cases, from the 1920s through
the 1960s, lawyers for black defendants presented the Court
22. See 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1967)
(discussing early NAACP protective litigation).
23. Nancy Fraser inspires the term "politics of recognition," even though
she uses it somewhat differently from the way I do. On the politics of recogni-
tion for the civil rights movement, see KLUGER, supra note 21 (providing a de-
tailed examination of the NAACP's antiapartheid litigation campaign); MARK
V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (similar); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity
and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1979).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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with factually frightening scenarios where the Justices did not
see their choice as being doctrinal innovation versus stare de-
cisis; instead, they saw their choice as applying the Constitu-
tion to serve its underlying rule of law purposes versus tolerat-
ing a state of nature in the South.25 Once the Justices had
decided these cases, the NAACP could cite them as precedent
for regulating less-frightening scenarios and for framing
broader constitutional rules. The Inc. Fund's famous decades-
long litigation campaign to end apartheid was the apotheosis of
the case-by-case approach taken by the same lawyers in the
criminal procedure cases.26 Viewing the evolution of doctrine
from case to case provides many examples of how judges from a
range of perspectives could agree with minority claims when
presented in the context of outrageous facts or new develop-
ments in formal law.
A limitation of naive strategies was that the new fact
situations and novel angles on old issues allowed judges to cre-
ate favorable doctrine but did not compel them to do so. Accord-
ingly, the Inc. Fund and allied attorneys also followed sophisti-
cated strategies, which assumed that judges' decisions were
influenced by their own political preferences, and sought to
mold or appeal to those preferences. The Justices appointed by
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower were commit-
ted to a democratic pluralism, whereby all groups would, at
least as a formal matter, have a fair chance to sway public
opinion and participate in government.27 Civil rights lawyers
could argue that deprivation of political and civil rights (voting
and jury exclusions, segregation) to minorities was inconsistent
with the open and pluralistic features of American democracy
that set it apart from Nazi and Communist totalitarianism.
The uncomfortable echoes of Nazi racism or Communist totali-
tarianism in the race cases outraged some of the Justices and
made even the least sympathetic Justices reluctant to oppose
25. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2073-82, 2202-35
(providing detailed analysis of the NAACP's criminal procedure and habeas
corpus cases); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48 (2000) (giving a close examination of the earli-
est NAACP criminal procedure cases).
26. See supra note 21 (listing the classic and popular accounts of the liti-
gation campaign).
27. See RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177-233
(1999); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 197-217, 235-66
(1973).
1028 [Vol 88:1021
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any relief whatsoever.
It is important to understand that the civil rights move-
ment was far more than strategic-it was overwhelmingly
normative from the beginning. Its foundational politics was to
change public norms away from understanding racial variation
(nonwhite) as malignant, toward understanding racial varia-
tion as completely benign.2 9 To the extent that the movement
was successful in moving public opinion and political discourse
in the benign variation direction, that success had payoffs in
constitutional litigation as well. Once Justices realized that the
audience for their opinions included many critics who viewed
people of color as just as important to the body politic as white
people, the Justices changed the tone of their writing and made
an effort to understand and appear responsive to minority
claims. Thus, even the conservative Eisenhower appointees
(like Harlan and Stewart) were willing to join more liberal Jus-
tices (like Douglas and Warren) in aggressively interpreting the
Constitution to protect people of color against hostile or dis-
criminatory state action.
Cynical strategies assume that Justices are partisan and
essentially just part of the political process. The most obvious
punch line for this strategy is to fight for your allies to be ap-
pointed to the Court and to oppose appointment of known ene-
mies. It was very important for the civil rights movement when
Thurgood Marshall was appointed to the Court, not just be-
cause he could be expected to vote for their interests and articu-
late their politics of recognition, but also because his mere
presence in conference discredited extremist arguments and
undermined some moderate arguments deployed by the politics
of preservation. Conversely, all four twentieth-century judges
nominated for the Court but defeated by a Senate vote were
opposed mainly by the NAACP and their allies, who viewed the
nominees as prejudiced against minorities.3 0 Even the most
28. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and
Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741,
761-79 (1981).
29. See Appendix to Appellants' Briefs, "The Effects of Segregation and
the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement," Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Oct. Term, 1952, No. 8).
30. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989) (discussing the defeat of Reagan's nomi-
nee Judge Bork); JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 57-61, 92-95 (1991) (discussing the defeat of Nixon's
nominee Judge Haynsworth); id. at 100-17 (discussing the defeat of Nixon's
2004] 1029
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conservative Presidents have been forced to take account of the
civil rights movement in their efforts to reshape the Court."
A very similar phenomenon can be observed in the Su-
preme Court's response to women's rights movements. The
birth control movement, the pro-choice movement, and the
equal rights for women (or ERA) movement followed the same
kind of naive, sophisticated, and cynical strategies followed by
the Inc. Fund and other civil rights litigation groups. Even
many of the players were the same; the ACLU was important
in both civil rights and women's rights constitutional litigation,
for example. And the Court was supremely responsive, al-
though it generally has filtered the demands of social move-
ments through the lens of its own institutional interests and
the ideologies of the Justices. Legal bars to women's reproduc-
tive and other freedoms and to their equal opportunities could
not be sustained once women started seriously to assert their
equal citizenship as participants in the national political proc-
ess.
Ironically, the Burger Court, populated with more conser-
vative, "strict constructionist" Justices than the Warren Court,
nominee Judge Carswell); KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF
AGE": THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN PARKER (1990) (discussing the defeat of
Hoover's nominee Judge Parker).
31. Accordingly, the dominant strategy for conservative Republican Presi-
dents has been to nominate conservatives who can be said to "represent" tradi-
tionally Democratic minority groups with whom Republicans are seeking in-
roads-women (Justice O'Connor), Catholics (Scalia and Kennedy), people of
color (Thomas), bachelors (Souter), and Latinos (presumably the group from
which the second President Bush would draw for a nomination). This strategy
has yielded a Supreme Court that is both ideologically conservative and de-
mographically diverse. The current Court is a veritable Rainbow Coalition
compared to the U.S. Senate, for example.
32. See generally DAVID J. GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994). On the birth control
movement, see generally ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET
SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1992); DAVID
KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET SANGER
(1970); JAMES REED, THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE (1984). On the pro-choice
movement, see generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN
THE STATES (2001); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991). On the
women's equal rights movement, see generally CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON
ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968 (1988); RUTH
ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
CHANGED AMERICA (2000).
1030 [Vol 88:1021
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handed down most of the constitutional precedents that
women's rights groups had. been seeking. In doing so, they ex-
panded constitutional text, ignored precedent, and danced
around original intent as they announced one pathbreaking de-
cision after another. Even conservatives in the new generation
of lawyers understood, from their own experiences or the ex-
periences of women close to them, that modern women were no
longer willing to live within baselines that had been set by
men. They were sexually active and demanded control over the
possibility of pregnancy and childbirth; they were educated and
demanded integration of public colleges and universities; they
were working outside the home and insisted that their work-
places not be hostile or discriminatory.
The landmark constitutional victories for women's rights-
Roe v. Wade33 and Craig v. Boren34-- came much more quickly
than the analogous victories for the civil rights movement-
Brown and the criminal procedure revolution associated with
Miranda v. Arizona35 and other precedents. One reason that
women won quicker courtroom victories was their potentially
enormous political clout, but also important was the timing: the
women's rights movement followed the civil rights one. The ex-
ample of African-Americans inspired women of all stations and
colors to imagine that they could be equal citizens with control
over their bodies. Because people of color had been able to
achieve much of their politics of protection and recognition
through assertion of constitutional due process and equal pro-
tection rights, women closely followed the Inc. Fund's model.36
Not least important, the success of the civil rights move-
ment provided even conservative Justices with reasons to ac-
cept women's constitutional claims (or at least meet them half-
way). The Justices were understandably proud of what they
had done in Brown and Loving v. Virginia,37 decisions univer-
sally acclaimed by law professors and soon accepted as axio-
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (announcing an intermediate level of scrutiny for
sex-based classifications).
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Jerold Israel, Selective Incorporation Re-
visited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982) (providing an excellent survey of the criminal
procedure decisions of the 1960s).
36. See Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-
Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045
(2001) (comparing the historical contexts of the civil rights and feminist
movements).
37. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding miscegenation laws unconstitutional).
2004] 1031
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matic among Americans of all political preferences. Reasoning
by analogy from the civil rights precedents, women's rights
counsel were asking the Court to add to its acclaim and were
implicitly suggesting that the Court would be subject to criti-
cism if it did not extend the reasoning of civil rights precedents
to women's claims.38 The question of women's rights could no
longer be avoided on the ground that the Court did not enforce
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses aggressively-
the Court had done precisely that in Brown and Loving, deci-
sions women were asking the Court to extend to their claims.
The Burger Court complied.
Inspired by the foregoing precedents, gay people in the
1960s and 1970s asserted both equality claims and privacy
claims. In contrast to the politics of the earlier social move-
ments, the central aim of gay people's politics of both protection
and recognition was the same legal reform-nullification of
sodomy laws." Such laws were a situs for state violence against
gay and bisexual men, many of whom went to prison for con-
sensual activities and many more of whom were subjected to
police and private harassment because of their presumptive
outlaw status. Hence, gay people's politics of protection re-
quired sodomy reform. Their outlaw status as presumptive
sodomites also undergirded many state discriminations, hence
gay people's politics of recognition asserted that they could not
be genuinely equal citizens unless their characteristic sexual
activities were decriminalized. Indeed, many state antigay pre-
sumptions and discriminations were expressly grounded upon
38. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause requires the state to justify deny-
ing a benefit to person A that it gives to person B. The Court's willingness to
help people of color (group B) by sweeping away race-based discriminations
created expectations on the part of women (group A) that sex-based discrimi-
nations against them would be similarly swept away. One can imagine several
justifications the Court could have used to treat groups B and A differently-
but the point is that the Justices would have felt pressure to treat them the
same and would have had to produce exceedingly persuasive reasons not to do
so. Realizing that the relevant audience for constitutional decisions regarding
citizenship and equality was increasingly women as well as men, few Justices
would have been willing to make the effort.
39. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2159-79 (describ-
ing the evolution of gay rights politics). The civil rights movement's politics of
protection focused on criminal procedure and the racist operation of the death
penalty, while its politics of recognition challenged rules of race-based segre-
gation. See id. at 2072-96. Women's politics of protection focused on rape re-
form, the availability of birth control materials and devices, and abortion;
their politics of recognition challenged sex classifications resting upon archaic
stereotypes. See id. at 2113-38.
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the illegal conduct that defined the class.
Before 1986, the Supreme Court was completely unrecep-
tive to these arguments. Most of the Justices operated under
the widely accepted social norm that homosexuality is a malig-
nant sexual variation.40 Based upon this assumption, the Jus-
tices ruled (or left in place rulings) that Congress can bar gay
immigrants from entering the country,41 states can send gay
men to jail for long periods of time for engaging in consensual
oral sex in private places,42 states can deny marriage licenses to
same-sex couples,43 local school boards can fire teachers or
counselors if they are "outed" as lesbigay,44 and municipalities
can arrest men and women for dressing in the attire of the
other sex.45
While the Court was tolerating each and every antigay rul-
ing that came before it, gay people were engaged in a politics of
40. The Justices did not have to explain how homosexuality might be ma-
lignant, for that was widely accepted as a social fact. Several explanations
showed up in Supreme Court opinions. (1) Homosexuality entails conduct that
was an "abomination" to religious Americans, Leviticus 13:20, and disgusting
to an even wider range. See Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 526 (1962)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (expressing disgust that the Court would allow the mail-
ing of male physique magazines that homosexuals could use as "sex stimu-
lants"). (2) Homosexuality is a mental illness. For many doctors as well as
lawyers, homosexuality was one example of "sexual psychopathy." See Boutil-
ier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 124 (1967) (interpreting an immigration exclusion for
people "afflicted with psychopathic personality" to include "those having ho-
mosexual and perverted characteristics"). (3) Homosexuality is predatory or
contagious. If exposed to homosexuality, youth might become infected. See
Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (comparing
homosexuality to contagious measles and arguing that the state ought to be
able to "quarantine" homosexuals in its colleges and universities, lest young
people be exposed to it). For anecdotal evidence that individual Justices
operated under these norms, see JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING
JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
41. Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
42. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem. 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); Enslin v. State, 425 U.S. 903 (1976), denying
cert. to 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding state felony conviction
and one-year prison sentence for consensual oral sex).
43. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appeal from 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
44. Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), denying cert.
to 703 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
45. Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denying certiorari to Harris
County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 decision); see Unheard, "No-Merit" Rul-
ing: Supreme Court Upholds Drag Ban, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 24, 1974, at 10
(noting that Texas defended the cross-dressing law as protecting the survival
of the human race by banning "homosexual disguises").
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recognition at the state level. Americans in the Northeast,
Great Lakes region, and West Coast by and large accepted
LGBT people's claims that they and their private conduct did
not pose threats to the community. States in those regions not
only repealed their consensual sodomy laws, but in some cases
adopted laws making it illegal for employers, schools, or public
accommodations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. This was a signal that social norms were changing: Once
universally accepted as malignant, homosexuality was now un-
derstood as a tolerable variation from the norm (still hetero-
sexuality).
When the Supreme Court took review in Hardwick, there
was hope that the Court would sweep away the remaining sod-
omy laws. Several amicus briefs argued that homosexuality is
in no way pathological and that consensual sodomy is impor-
tant to the psychological health of individuals and to their in-
timate relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual.46
The state responded that the statute reflected the moral judg-
ments of the people of Georgia, and the Court could not legiti-
mately interfere with those judgments unless required by con-
stitutional text or well-established precedent. Justice White's
perfunctory opinion for the Court agreed with the state, con-
cluding that it was illegitimate for the unelected Justices to
overturn the state legislature's moral judgment that sodomy is
wrong, without a firmer basis in constitutional text or tradi-
tion.47 Even within that framework, however, White's obsessive
focus on "homosexual sodomy," notwithstanding the statute's
inclusion of sodomy of all kinds, exposed the Court to criticism
that it was not treating gay people impartially.48
46. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and
American Public Health Association in Support of Respondents passim, Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); see also Brief Amicus Cu-
riae for Lesbian Rights Project et al. passim, Hardwick (No. 85-140) (making a
similar argument, plus noting that sodomy laws contribute to rampant dis-
crimination against gay people in particular).
47. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95; see also id. at 191-94 (stating that the
argument that "homosexual sodomy" is protected by the nation's libertarian
tradition is, "at best, facetious").
48. Compare id. at 190, 191, 192, 196 (limiting the decision to "homosex-
ual sodomy"), and id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (similar), with id. at
200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is morally arbitrary for
the Court to insist that only "homosexual sodomy" is at stake when the chal-
lenged statute covers all kinds of sodomy), and id. at 215-16 & 215 n.6 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Georgia legislature deliberately expanded
its sodomy law to include all different-sex sodomy).
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Four dissenting Justices not only questioned the Court's
analysis, but recognized the link among LGBT people's equal
citizenship and a constitutional insistence on a more tolerant
approach to benign sexual variation:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is "a sensitive key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human per-
sonality." The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests,
in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways
of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds."9
The dissenters also contrasted the Court's passivity in Hard-
wick with its productive activism in Brown, Loving, and Roe,
all of which have been cogently criticized for expanding consti-
tutional freedoms beyond the boundaries suggested by constitu-
tional text and original intent.50
While Hardwick marked the Supreme Court's rejection of
gay people's constitutional politics, it came just as gay people's
normative politics was starting to show some success-
persuading many Americans that homosexuality was at least a
tolerable variation from the norm, one that ought not be the ba-
sis for criminalization.5' Gay people's politics also persuaded
49. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)) (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 210-11 & 210 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, associated with the
University of Connecticut, found in September 1985 that 31% of a national
sample agreed that "homosexuality should be considered an acceptable life-
style," with 62% saying it is "basically wrong." Roper Center for Public Opin-
ion Research, Univ. of Ct., The Roper Report (Sept. 1985) (on file with author).
This suggests a minority accepting homosexuality as a benign variation, and a
large majority seeing it as something less than benign. A more nuanced poll
conducted by Mark Clement Research for Glamour in the summer of 1986 re-
ported that 800 women responded to the statement, "Homosexuality should be
an accepted alternative lifestyle," in this way:
18% Strongly Agree
28% Slightly Agree
13% Slightly Disagree
38% Strongly Disagree
4% No Opinion
This suggests, to me, that a large middle group (41%) found homosexuality a
tolerable variation, with a small minority (18%) accepting the benign variation
view of gay rights supporters and a bigger minority (38%) accepting the ma-
lign variation view adopted in Hardwick. Data from the study was published
in Glamour's January 1987 issue. See How Women's Minds Have Changed in
the Last Five Years, 1987 Women's Views Survey, GLAMOUR, Jan. 1987, at 168
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some Americans that homosexuality is a benign variation and
that gay people are normal and good citizens. Most important,
public opinion polls in 1985 suggested that a majority of Ameri-
cans believed that, in the long term, homosexuality "will be
widely acceptable. "52 Thus, the normative underpinnings of the
Supreme Court's decision (that states are free to deem homo-
sexuality a malignant variation) stood in direct tension with
the new equilibrium in public opinion (homosexuality is at least
a tolerable variation).
Under this state of affairs, Hardwick was more disastrous
for the Court than it was for gay people. Justice White's opinion
was subjected to a level of academic, popular, and judicial scru-
tiny that virtually no Supreme Court opinion could survive.
The opinion carried with it many self-inflicted errors, and news
reports of hysterical lobbying by the Chief Justice and of Jus-
tice Powell's homo-ignorant anguishing over his vote deepened
the bad odor of Hardwick.54 Many Americans, gay and straight
alike, read the result and rhetoric of Hardwick as suggesting
that the judiciary was not a neutral forum for gay people to
(data set on file with author).
52. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Univ. of Ct., The Roper Re-
port 85-86 (June 1985) (finding that 52% of a national sample of 2000 respon-
dents agreed with the statement in the text; 40% disagreed) (on file with au-
thor). According to the Roper Center, a Gallup Poll asking the same question
found 53% agreeing, 34% disagreeing.
53. Hardwick generated more universal negative comment than any other
decision upholding a statute in the Court's history. For a sampling of the in-
tense criticisms, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION-A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991) (poorly reasoned);
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 341-47 (1992) (factually ignorant); EVE
KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 70-75 (1990) (manipu-
lative); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1422
(2d ed. 1988) (inconsistent with precedent); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homo-
sexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1102-03 (1988) (historically inaccu-
rate); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 187, 197-200 (antifeminist); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1987) (authoritarian); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747-50 (1989) (authoritarian); Kendall Tho-
mas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1461 (1992) (vio-
lent). See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative
Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 645 n.95 (1990)
(citing thirty-three law review articles and comments criticizing Hardwick).
54. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 514-30
(1994) (providing a comprehensive account of Justice Powell's vacillation on
the sodomy issue); Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASH.
POST, July 13, 1986, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy
Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3.
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present their constitutional and other claims.
In the abstract, the Court could have lived with the public
criticism of Hardwick if it could have moved on to other issues.
But Hardwick would not go away. Everywhere the Justices
turned, there were openly lesbian and gay attorneys, law pro-
fessors, citizens-and (gasp!) even law clerks within their own
building. Everywhere the Justices went in the world, people
asked them how they could demonize gay people as they had in
Hardwick. And every year dozens of new antigay discrimina-
tions popped up all over the United States-justified by reading
Hardwick to suggest that open homosexuals, presumptive out-
laws, were essentially outside the protection of the Constitu-
tion. At some point, the Justices were bound to call a halt to
this.
The case that attracted their attention arose in Colorado.
Alarmed by local antidiscrimination laws "promoting" homo-
sexuality, Colorado for Family Values (CFV) proposed to amend
the state constitution in 1992 to preempt any state or munici-
pal law or policy whereby homosexuality could be the basis for
"any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination." In its campaign for voter ratification,
CFV argued that overprivileged (high-income) lesbigay people
did not need the "special rights" that cities were giving them
and that special rights for "homosexuals and lesbians" threat-
ened to deprive ordinary citizens of their rights to speak freely,
worship as they choose, associate with whom they choose, and
control the education of their children.55 After the voters
adopted the proposed amendment, gay people challenged it as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Colorado defended the
law as within its rights under the regime of Hardwick. If the
state can make homosexual sodomites common criminals,
which Colorado did not, then surely they could impose some
civil discriminations on them. "Coloradans are largely tolerant
of homosexuality, yet unwilling to support governmental action
55. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, EQUAL RIGHTS-NoT SPECIAL
RIGHTS! (1992) (the official ballot materials distributed to voters as an expla-
nation of the proposed amendment), reprinted in Robert F. Nagel, Playing De-
fense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 167, app. A at 191-99 (1997); see STEPHEN
BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY
OF AMENDMENT 2, at 36-40, app. C at 241-44 (1994) (giving an insider's ac-
count of the CFV campaign themes); cf. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law-
making Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexual-
ity, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19-21 (1993) (describing a similar Oregon antigay
initiative).
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which confers benefits on a relatively privileged group at the
expense of the less-privileged."56
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court ruled that the anti-
gay amendment was invalidY. That amendment's invalidity
owed something to its breadth, for it effectively authorized em-
ployers, landlords, and public accommodations to discriminate
against gay people, but left straight people with a remedy if
they were objects of sexual orientation discrimination. The
Court could therefore have issued a very narrow ruling:
Broadly excluding one class of people from the ordinary protec-
tions of the rule of law is a core violation of the requirement
that the state afford "the equal protection of the law."58 Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court, however, was unprecedented
in the extent to which it paid tribute to LGBT people's politics
of recognition. The opinion not only referred to the respondents
respectfully as gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, but articu-
lated the protections served by antidiscrimination laws as
"normal" protections everyone else either takes for granted or
enjoys-and not as the "special rights" claimed by the state and
the dissenting opinion.59 Justice Kennedy also openly recog-
nized that much of the support of the amendment was inspired
by antigay "animus," again a striking contrast with the dis-
60sent's emphasis on Coloradan tolerance.
Most strikingly, the six-Justice majority ignored Hardwick,
a silence stressed by Justice Scalia in dissent.61 Romer left
Hardwick in constitutional limbo, but Hardwick in turn cast
some doubt on how broadly the Court was prepared to read
Romer. This left the lower courts to their own devices. Gener-
ally speaking, Romer coincided with, and probably contributed
to, a strong progay shift in state court decisions affecting LGBT
56. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039). The state reported polling data showing that large majorities of
Coloradans believed that "homosexuals are not really different from anyone
else" and should be allowed to serve in the military and engage in private in-
timacy with consenting adults. Id. at 15 n.24.
57. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
58. Id.
59. Compare id. at 630-31 (majority opinion), with id. at 638 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). On the deployment of "special rights" rhetoric by anti-civil rights
as well as antigay groups, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate
in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 283, 288-91 (1994).
60. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634-35 (majority opinion), with id.
at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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people. After 1996, a number of state courts in the Northeast,
Midwest, and West Coast handed down landmark rulings in fa-
vor of same-sex marriage, second-parent adoptions, and equal
employment benefits.2 Starting from antigay baselines, courts
in the South, Border States, and Rocky Mountain States did
not go that far, but after Romer many of them did retreat from
disrespectful and openly discriminatory treatment of lesbian
and gay parents. More significantly, judges in these states is-
sued a series of decisions invalidating consensual sodomy laws
under their state constitutions-in striking contrast to the Su-
preme Court's rejection of Hardwick's privacy challenge.63 Only
in Louisiana and Texas did judges refuse invitations to strike
down state sodomy laws after Romer.64 The Texas case, of
course, was the occasion for the Supreme Court to revisit either
Hardwick or Romer.
As it turned out, Lawrence provided the Justices with an
opportunity to revisit both Hardwick and Romer-overruling
the first precedent and reading the second precedent expan-
sively.65 Formally, Lawrence confirmed the view that antigay
sentiment was no more a rational basis under the Due Process
Clause than it had been under the Equal Protection Clause.
The state cannot discriminate against gay people simply be-
cause of their sexual orientation; invoking "morality" does not
save such discrimination. Lawrence also nullified consensual
sodomy laws. This holding negated a powerful argument states
had been using to justify antigay presumptions in family law,
state employment, and public education."
62. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 283-97, 1081-82, 1553-63 (2d ed. 2004) (same-sex
marriages); id. at 1199-1224 (parenting and second-parent adoption cases); id.
at 879-84, 1048-62 (employment benefits for domestic partners).
63. The first such decision was before Romer. See Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500 (Ky. 1992). For decisions striking down consen-
sual sodomy laws under state constitutions after Romer, see Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, (June
10, 1996), Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 127 (Mont. 1997), Powell v.
State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (the Hardwick law), State v. Cogshell, 997
S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, (Oct. 1, 2002), and Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.2d 332, 353-54 (Ark. 2002).
64. State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501, 512 (La. 2000); Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482-84 (2003).
66. The sodomy argument for antigay discrimination goes something like
this: (1) This lesbian presumptively engages in illegal sodomy. (2) The state
can prefer law-abiding citizens to law-breaking citizens in deciding who gets
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Rhetorically, Lawrence confirmed that Romer was no fluke.
Six Justices were committed to the proposition that lesbian,
gay, and bisexual Americans must be treated with respect by
legislators as well as judges. The respect paid to gay people was
complemented by the disrespect paid to Hardwick. Justice
Kennedy's opinion opened with the statement that the previous
precedent "fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake" and phrased the issue presented in a way "that de-
mean[ed] the claim the individual put forward."67 He then ex-
amined the historiographical criticisms of Hardwick and its
universal rejection in national and international public opin-
ion." The Court concluded that "Hardwick was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today."69 Never in its
history has the Supreme Court so pointedly repudiated a
precedent. With this rebuke, an era in constitutional history
ended.
Read together, Romer and Lawrence represent a regime
shift for gay people analogous to the regime shift that Brown
and Loving represented for people of color and that Roe 70 and
Craig7' represented for women. In all three sets of cases, the
Court announced a new constitutional baseline that was sub-
stantially closer to the norms espoused by an identity-based so-
cial movement, albeit with some interesting differences among
the three pairs of cases. In Brown/Loving, the Court accepted
the norm that racial variation is benign as a matter of fact and
ought to be treated as irrelevant as a matter of law. In
Roe/Craig, the Court accepted the norm that sex variation is
wonderful as a matter of fact and ought to be treated as sub-
stantially irrelevant as a matter of law. In Romer/Lawrence,
the Court accepted the norm that sexual variation is tolerable
as a matter of fact and ought to be treated as presumptively ir-
relevant as a matter of law.
In each of the realigning pairs of precedents, the Court
viewed the long-term action of the law on social minorities at
custody of children after the demise of a marriage, whom the state should hire
as police officers or prosecuting attorneys, or who can be foster or adoptive
parents. (3) Therefore, the state can prefer the law-abiding heterosexual to the
law-breaking lesbian.
67. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
68. Id. at 2478-83.
69. Id. at 2484.
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
71. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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least partially through the eyes of the minorities and spoke to
them as equal citizens who have to be treated with respect and
dignity-and not as outcasts (people of color) or housekeepers
(women) or outlaws (gay people). In my view, the Court had no
choice but to make these moves if it were to retain the aura of
neutrality that is essential for its legitimacy. But I also believe
that at least some of the Justices were motivated by something
more than institutional self-interest. The time had come, they
understood, for America to move beyond discriminatory rules
that the objects of the discrimination would no longer accept.
This regime shift does not entail radical changes in the law
overnight. To the contrary, each regime shift has come deliber-
ately, even slowly, and certainly incompletely from the social
movement's point of view. The Court declined to order immedi-
ate desegregation after Brown I; the "all deliberate speed" for-
mula of Brown If had little bite until the Great Society.72 And it
took the Court thirteen years after Brown to muster the cour-
age to nullify miscegenation laws in Loving.3 Because resis-
tance was much lower to ending sex discrimination, the Court
moved more swiftly on that front, while at the same time re-
treating from Roe when it encountered resurgent opposition to
its broad protections for pregnant women.74 Like the Brown
Court, the Romer/Lawrence Court will probably leave it to lo-
cal state and federal judges to decide which antigay discrimina-
tions stand or fall. Like the Casey Court,75 the Court ten or
twenty years hence may retreat from some of the sweeping
rhetoric of Romer/Lawrence. Or, like the VMI Court, it may
give it deeper bite. 6 What is certain is that the Supreme Court
in Romer/Lawrence sees itself as having swept away the prior
constitutional regime of Hardwick and initiated a new constitu-
tional regime where tolerance of LGBT people is a floor below
which state policy cannot fall.
72. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("all deliberate
speed" formula); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979) (nonenforce-
ment of Brown I until 1960s).
73. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
74. See Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the
New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77 (1995);
Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orient-
ing Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994).
75. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
76. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536-37 (1996).
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II. LAWRENCE, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME SHIFTS
The Lawrence dissenters objected that shifting regimes to
require tolerance of a previously despised minority group is a
political judgment that should be left to the legislature. 7 To the
extent it is a constitutional judgment, it is one properly left to
"We the People" acting through an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. In short, it is not a legal judgment to be made by the Su-
preme Court. The Court said nothing in direct response. One
answer to such an objection is that the Supreme Court's indi-
vidual rights jurisprudence for the twentieth century stands
against it.75 The process for amending the Constitution is mori-
bund. For the Court to abandon almost 100 years of activism,
and to use LGBT people as the victims to accomplish that volte-
face, would be a daring and surely futile move. 9
Another answer is that regime shifts are not only possible,
but are sometimes required of the Supreme Court as the inter-
preter of the Fourteenth Amendment. An underlying debate in
Lawrence relates to the methodology by which the Court ought
to be interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments. Although
the dissenting Justices are much more certain that their origi-
nal meaning approach is the only legitimate one for constitu-
tional interpretation, I believe Lawrence illustrates the desir-
ability of an equally distinguished tradition, rooted in legal
process theory.
A. HARDWICK AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ORIGINAL MEANING
Justice Scalia's central complaint is that the Lawrence
Court was departing from constitutional text, original meaning,
and precedent when it overruled Hardwick-and that the
Court was doing that for an illegitimate politically correct rea-
son: to impose the "homosexual agenda" supported by intellec-
77. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2497 (2003).
78. This is the argument extensively documented in Eskridge, Twentieth
Century, supra note 20, at 2375-89.
79. The move would be futile because whatever the Court were to do in
gay rights cases, it would still be tempted to engage in the same amendment-
denying activism in other cases, such as affirmative action, redistricting, tak-
ings, and federalism cases for die-hard conservatives, and women's rights, ra-
cial segregation, death penalty, and abortion cases for moderates. For both
camps, they would include speech and freedom-of-association cases. For an ob-
viously activist Court to deny most minimal rights to gay people-and them
alone-would ultimately destroy that Court's appearance of neutrality.
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tuals and elites on an unwilling populace." There is legal bite
to Scalia's critique. In his understanding, the Constitution is
our social contract, a historically powerful one in which "We the
People" actually participated in ratifying the permanent
framework for governance. Because the legitimacy of the social
contract is democratic and participatory, the contract should be
interpreted and applied by judges according to its original
meaning-the meaning that it would have had for the white
men ratifying the original document or any of its twenty-seven
amendments. Conversely, it is a violation of the social contract
for unelected judges to read their own values into the Constitu-
tion, thereby trumping the values woven into the document by
our ancestors, as well as those more recently adopted by our
elected officials.
This classic jurisprudence of original intent is inspired by
many worthy values, including the rule of law, democracy, and
deliberation. If judges follow an objectively determinable origi-
nal meaning, they are imbuing constitutional law with the rule
of law values of objectivity, transparency, and predictability.
Although such original meaning will sometimes trump the will
of current majorities, it is ultimately consistent with democracy
because it reflects the will of engaged supermajorities. Not
least important, the Constitution of 1787, the Bill of Rights,
and the Reconstruction Amendments were the products of an
active and alert citizenry deliberating in the most intelligent
way about the enduring structure of American governance.
If judges ignore or misapply original constitutional mean-
ing, they are sacrificing the virtues of a rule of law, democracy,
and deliberation. The sacrifice is doubly harmful-and com-
pletely indefensible-if judges substitute their own will or pref-
erences for those of the Framers. This was the point Byron
White was trying to make in Hardwick, and a point that would
have been made more effectively without the gratuitously anti-
homosexual language. There is no right of sexual privacy in the
constitutional text, nor was one ever mentioned in the constitu-
tional deliberations. The Due Process Clause does protect "lib-
erty," but primarily by assuring persons that the state will fol-
low appropriate procedures if it threatens to deprive them of
liberties. A line of precedent also gives a substantive, anti-
arbitrariness protection to certain kinds of liberties-those that
80. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' If this test
were nothing more than an abstract exercise, it would amount
to the codification of judicial preferences. To avoid the pall of
judicial legislation, Justice White reasoned, the Court has typi-
cally applied the test by an historical inquiry: Has this liberty
been one which has traditionally been considered beyond state
regulation in Anglo-American history?
This line of "substantive due process" cases was the basis
for the Court's decisions assuring women substantial freedom
of choice to use contraceptives and to have abortions.82 Intelli-
gent judges and commentators criticized those decisions as in-
consistent with the original meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments; which were adopted in a period when the states
were regulating the availability of contraceptives and prohibit-
ing abortions. Without some affirmative basis for believing that
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect
people's decisions relating to procreation and childbirth, the in-
terpreter should assume that the Framers did not mean to dis-
place existing regulations of such activities. Such should have
been the assumption in Eisenstadt and Roe, which were, by
Justice White's standards, wrongly decided.83 They were ille-
gitimate judicial legislation, because they represented the Jus-
tices' personal views that contraception and abortion were fun-
damental to women's lives. The Court had substituted its own
value system for those of both the historical Framers and cur-
rent legislators, and that kind of judicial arrogance was the
height of illegitimacy.
For Justice White then, Hardwick presented the Court
with a choice of either expanding the illegitimate reasoning of
Eisenstadt and Roe, or limiting the damage those precedents
had on judicial legitimacy by narrowing their holdings to their
particular factual settings (decisions not to have children). Jus-
81. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 544-49 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Justice Cardozo said in
Palko, the Due Process Clause protects freedom of thought and speech against
state regulation because they constitute a "matrix, the indispensable condi-
tion, of nearly every other form of freedom." 302 U.S. at 327.
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
83. Justice White concurred in the Griswold judgment on narrow grounds
and did not reach the general right to privacy discussion entailed in the opin-
ions of Justices Douglas (for the Court), Goldberg, and Harlan. Griswold, 381
U.S. at 502-05. White concurred in the result in Eisenstadt and dissented in
Roe. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460; Roe, 410 U.S. at 221.
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tice White preferred the latter course of action, but remained
open to the possibility that Anglo-American tradition consid-
ered consensual sodomy an activity that should not be regu-
lated. Unfortunately, he framed the inquiry in a biased and
anachronistic way by asking only whether "homosexual sod-
omy" was historically protected. He concluded the inquiry in a
dismissive manner when he said that gay people's liberty claim
was "at best, facetious."84
If one can edit out the antihomosexual slant, the inquiry
itself was consistent with the jurisprudence of original mean-
ing. Justice White could easily have written a more judicious
opinion upholding the Georgia sodomy law. Such an opinion
would have started with the presumption that the burden is on
the challenger, Mr. Hardwick, to demonstrate through histori-
cal as well as logical evidence, that consensual sodomy is an ac-
tivity implicit in the concept of ordered liberty according to our
legal tradition. The fact that almost all the states made the
crime against nature a serious offense in their earlier criminal
codes would render Hardwick's burden even higher. One might
contrast marriage, strongly protected against state intrusion in
the nineteenth century, with nonmarital sodomy, regulated in
almost all the states. Marriage is a zone of privacy implicit in
the Anglo-American traditions of ordered liberty, and this pro-
vides a sufficient justification for the privacy protected in Gris-
wold. Hardwick's case was not as clear, and was at best doubt-
ful-the Court needs a clearer historical record to invalidate
state legislation under the Due Process Clause. This approach
would have yielded the same result: Statute upheld; Eisenstadt
and Roe limited to their particular facts.
B. LAWRENCE AS A CRITIQUE OF ORIGINAL MEANING
JURISPRUDENCE
Even a more judiciously written original meaning opinion
would have been problematic in Hardwick, however. Indeed,
Hardwick illustrates several of the problems with originalism
as a constitutional methodology.85 It does not constrain judicial
84. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
85. For criticisms of original meaning jurisprudence, see Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defi-
nition of Rights, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Mark V. Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
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discretion, poses unanswerable questions, and is not the most
legitimate means for discerning constitutional meaning in a
polity where the citizenship line has been socially redrawn.
1. Indeterminacy
One problem with original meaning jurisprudence is its in-
determinacy; an indeterminate methodology does not constrain
the interpreter. The historical mise en scne for 1868 (and even
more for 1789) is very hard for historians to reconstruct in all
its complexity. It is even harder for Supreme Court Justices,
who are, at best, amateur historians. Hardwick reflects the
genuine risks of historical error when judges engage in law-
office history. Law-office history typically searches for historical
fragments supporting one side or another of a legal dispute.
This is an inherently bad way of doing history. As Professor
Martin Flaherty insists, competent legal history is not possible
unless the interpreter understands the intellectual context of
the period as well as the on-point details.86
Drawing from amicus briefs filed by the Cato Institute and
by several eminent historians of sexuality, Lawrence concluded
that Hardwick reflected a poor job of historical analysis. 7 For
example, Hardwick was wrong to view "homosexual sodomy" as
the trans-historical object of Anglo-American crime against na-
ture laws. Not only were male-female relations regulated by
such laws, but female-female relations were not subject to sod-
omy laws anywhere in the English-speaking world until the
twentieth century. Indeed, the concept of "homosexual" any-
thing did not emerge in western civilization until the end of the
nineteenth century.8 Almost all of the reported sodomy prose-
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). Responses to these criticisms and newer defenses of
originalism include Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849 (1989).
86. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutional-
ism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 550-56 (1995); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1747-55 (1996) (applying a rig-
orous historicism to criticize amateur superficial accounts by leading legal
scholars).
87. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477-82 (2003); Brief for the
Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-17, 22-30,
Lawrence (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Cato Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae Profes-
sors of History in Support of Petitioners at 3-19, id. [hereinafter Historians'
Briefl.
88. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79; see Historians' Brief, supra note 87,
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cutions from the nineteenth century involved nonconsensual or
public conduct by men preying on weaker children, women, or
other men.89 In short, the focus of crime against nature laws
was neither homosexual nor consensual activities as far as one
can discern from the historical record. Thus, Justice White's
"strong" claim that American laws criminalizing consensual
"homosexual sodomy" have "ancient roots" was, "at best, face-
tious" as a matter of serious historiography.
As Justice Kennedy concluded, the historical analysis in
Hardwick was "overstated."90 He then recognized that there are
powerful moral authorities that condemn homosexual behavior
as "immoral," including authorities in the Roman Catholic
Church, the Justice's own faith. 91 But the duty of the Court,
Justice Kennedy opined, is "'to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.'"92 His subtle point was that Jus-
tice White was using history as a mechanism for writing his
own moral code into the Due Process Clause. 93
Significantly, Justice Scalia's scorched earth dissenting
opinion said nothing substantial in defense of the falsified his-
tory in Hardwick. Instead, he argued that none of the falsified
history was material, for the only relevant fact is that sodomy,
of all sorts, was traditionally a crime in American history.94
Even a jurist as careful as Justice Scalia missed a few points in
the historical record, such as the fact that conduct between two
women was not a crime in the nineteenth century, did not be-
come a crime in most states until well into the twentieth cen-
tury, and was almost never enforced even after it technically
at 6-11; Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 9-10. The Cato Brief also noted that be-
fore 1879, no state sodomy law regulated the oral sex Michael Hardwick was
charged with committing. Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 12.
89. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479; see Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 10-12.
90. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
93. This subtle point is made clearer by the next paragraph in Justice
Kennedy's opinion, which quotes Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
and its invocation of "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472.
As he did with Justice White, Justice Kennedy delivered a double rebuke to
the former Chief Justice: His sweeping historical statements were both inac-
curate and sectarian. Because its materials are so pliable, originalism not only
fails to constrain the biased judge, but also can be a mechanism for importing
bias into constitutional decision making. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
94. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2493-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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became a crime in most states.95 Again, the search for a pre-
ferred result blinded even the brightest jurist to the evidence.
There is another problem with the ability of original mean-
ing to constrain subsequent interpreters. Originalism's de-
ployment depends upon the level of generality at which one in-
terrogates the past. Even in the case of consensual sodomy, one
can get whatever answer one wants by how one poses the ques-
tion. In Lawrence, Harris County, Texas asked: Would the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment have intended that
consensual sodomy be a protected liberty under their amend-
ment? 6 No. The Cato Institute's Brief asked a different ques-
tion. The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to give Ameri-
cans clear notice of what duties the law required of them, to
protect their freedom of the body and of the home, and to avoid
class legislation. Did Texas undermine these purposes by ar-
resting Lawrence and Garner?97 Yes.
Which question is "truer" to original meaning? I am not
sure. Authors of directives intend that agents carry out their
specific expectations, but they also intend that agents apply
their directives with an eye to the purpose of those directives.
The practice of the Court has often been to pose original mean-
ing questions at a high level of generality. If you ask the ques-
tion with the level of specificity Harris County did, Brown and
Griswold were wrongly decided. No one is willing to overrule
these cases, and almost no one is willing to deny that they were
constitutional triumphs. So how can an original meaning theo-
rist tell the rest of us when to deploy his theory instead of de-
ploying a Brown-like approach?
2. Changed Circumstances
Eminent constitutional thinkers have taken the position
that the Framers of the Constitution and the Reconstruction
Amendments did not "mean" to bind future generations to the
specific expectations they had when their work was ratified by
"We the People."99 The Framers understood and accepted that
95. See Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 10-12.
96. Brief for Respondent Harris County, Texas at 8-12, Lawrence (No. 02-
102). The State of Texas, the nominal defendant in the case, did not file a
brief.
97. Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 18-30.
98. CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7-30 (1969); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 170-71 (1990); Alexander
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future generations would find their constitutional purposes
best fulfilled in unpredictable and unforeseen settings. This
suggests a second problem with originalism-the inevitability
of significantly changed circumstances. Once social, economic,
or normative conditions have changed in ways that affect an is-
sue, not only is originalism less attractive, it is also unwork-
able. There is no longer any possibility of posing the questions
neutrally, and the methodology becomes both incapable of con-
straining interpreters (as argued above) and quite capable of
constitutional wackiness.
In 1868, there was no concept of homosexuality, and it was
possible to believe that only a few demonic individuals were
sodomites. In 2003, we are all sodomites, and homosexuality is
now understood as a sexual orientation and not a terrible moral
or medical disease. These new social facts have got to affect the
issue posed in Hardwick and Lawrence. For precisely this rea-
son, an originalist can coherently pose Harris County's ques-
tion in ways that generate the Cato Briefs answer: If the
Framers knew that America would become a nation of well-
functioning sodomites and openly gay citizens, would they have
wanted the government to remain free to pry into these peo-
ple's bedrooms? Would the Framers believe that sodomy laws
comport with "due process of law" if the experts were all agreed
that such laws had no effect on the level of sodomy in a juris-
diction, were used primarily as excuses for police brutality and
private blackmail, and created a terror regime for responsible
and productive citizens of the community? If the Framers had
known that in the twentieth century sodomy laws would justify
the antihomosexual American Kulturkampf of 1946-69 (a pre-
cise parallel to the antihomosexual Nazi Kulturkampf of 1933-
45), would they have believed the laws were a valid exercise of
state power? Surely not.
Conversely, if you present the changed circumstances dif-
ferently from the way I have, you can pose the Cato Institute's
question in a way that generates Harris County's result. Tradi-
tionalists would say that in 2003 too many of us are sodo-
mites-but most are ashamed of that fact; homosexuality is at
best an unfortunate condition, like alcoholism. Many tradition-
alists also consider homosexuality contagious in some way.
Unless the polity takes a strong moral (and criminal) stance
M. Bickel, The Original Understanding of the Segregation Decisions, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 62-65 (1955); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903-04 (1985).
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against bad conduct, it will spread to vulnerable Americans,
especially young people.99 If our updated Framers believed
those new "facts," they might say "no" to the question whether
Americans ought to be free to engage in consensual intimacies
with other adults in their own homes. The general purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, they can argue, was not to protect
people whose conduct undermines the fabric of society.
There is no end to this mind game called original meaning.
3. Legitimacy and Evolving Citizenship
The third problem with originalism has to do with the le-
gitimacy of state action. The Framers assumed as universal
human truths some propositions that are now considered mor-
ally squalid, and not binding on us today. Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott is a classic application of original mean-
ing, but it has been discredited because it applied or found a
squalid original intent-the immoral institution of slavery.
100
To be sure, Dred Scott was overridden by the Reconstruction
Amendments, but the Framers of those amendments assumed
that de jure racial segregation was required by the nature of
things, and that women should not participate in the public
sector and should tend to their natural duties of raising chil-
dren. Those propositions are no longer morally or politically ac-
ceptable.
This argument is not simply an iteration of the changed
circumstances problem, for it goes to the normative foundation
of neutral judicial review, not just to its attainability. Dred
Scott held that people of color do not count for purposes of
American constitutionalism, and Plessy v. Ferguson and related
apartheid precedents amounted to almost the same thing.01
The Court in Bradwell v. Illinois assumed that women do not
count for purposes of American constitutionalism.' Once peo-
ple of color and women asserted serious claims to equal citizen-
ship, and American politics substantially accepted those claims,
99. Cf. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (analogizing homosexuality to "mea-
sles" and suggesting that people afflicted with "homosexuality," like people af-
flicted with measles, can be constitutionally subjected to "quarantine regula-
tions" to protect "others who do not presently have" the condition).
100. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-13 (1857).
101. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. 83 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1872) (upholding a statute that barred women
from practicing law).
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an overruling of Plessy and Bradwell was not only constitution-
ally acceptable but was constitutionally necessary. The compo-
sition of whom the Supreme Court recognized as "Ve the Peo-
ple" had to change. For reasons explored below, a national
politics where people of color and women are participants can-
not tolerate laws segregating people on grounds of race or sex.
Once people of color and women successfully insisted upon
being considered citizens participating in our nation's plural-
ism, the normative foundation for following the narrow view of
the Framers' original meaning was undermined. The Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted separate sphere norms
for both women and people of color-women to assure the per-
petuation of humankind and people of color to assure the purity
of the white race. Such an ideology cannot survive the flourish-
ing of women and people of color as equal citizens whose en-
gagement in the public sphere is welcome and productive.
Thus, one might conclude that once an identity-based social
movement has achieved some success in transforming norms
related to its group members, the original expectations of long-
departed constitutional Framers become at least partially obso-
lete. For this reason, the Supreme Court has openly abandoned
an original intent methodology in the race and sex discrimina-
tion cases. Should it do the same in LGBT rights cases?
C. LAWRENCE AND A LEGAL PROCESS ROLE FOR HISTORY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
None of the Justices in Lawrence took the position that his-
tory becomes irrelevant once identity norms have changed. A
wide array of progressive or liberal, as well as conservative,
constitutional scholars would agree. They have coined an as-
sortment of metaphors for thinking about original constitu-
tional meaning once norms as well as other circumstances have
changed. Bruce Ackerman calls the process synthesis: The cur-
rent interpreter must synthesize the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment with the transformative constitutional
moment of the New Deal."' Mark Tushnet terms the process
translation: The current interpreter must translate the nine-
teenth century norms of equal protection and liberty into the
103. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 453, 527-36 (1989) (explaining the notion of synthesis and applying it to
Brown and Plessy).
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modern regulatory state era.104
A more traditional legal approach that explains Justice
Kennedy's use of history in Lawrence is legal process theory.
Synthesizing jurisprudence of the New Deal period and the ad-
vent of the modern regulatory state, Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks maintained that legal interpreters should apply a
law to carry out its purpose, unless inconsistent with the text
or binding precedent.'0 5 The legal process approach, as they ar-
ticulated it, is both descriptive and normative. It seeks to un-
derstand the purpose of a particular legal enterprise, as its au-
thors understood it. 10 It also applies that purpose to current
circumstances with a critical eye: Which application best car-
ries out the legal purpose? (This is the core purposive inquiry.)
Which fits best with other developments in the law? 10 7 (This is a
coherence inquiry.) Is the best application one that the text and
precedent can support? 08 (This is a rule of law inquiry.)
Justice Kennedy, an alumnus of the Hart and Sacks Legal
Process course, followed this methodology in Lawrence."°9 One
primary purpose of the Due Process Clause, as the Framers
saw it and as the Court has applied it, is to protect people from
"unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places," and to assure people "an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain in-
timate conduct."" ° It is deeply inconsistent with this Four-
teenth Amendment liberty principle for the state to intrude into
104. Tushnet, supra note 85, at 800-01; see Brest, supra note 85; Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993) (listing
constitutional scholars who deploy the translation metaphor).
105. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1124-25, 1374-80 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tentative ed. 1958). Hart
and Sacks developed their theory as a matter of statutory interpretation, but
both contemporary and subsequent scholars applied the same philosophy to
generate theories of judicial review. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, in id.
at civ-cxxxiv (discussing constitutional theories applying the legal process ap-
proach).
106. HART & SACKS, supra note 105, at 1377-80.
107. Id. at 1376-77, 1380.
108. Id. at 1374-76 (text); id. at 1379 (precedent).
109. Five Justices of the current Court are alumni or alumnae of the Hart
and Sacks Legal Process course at Harvard: Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.
110. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003); see Cato Brief, supra
note 87, at 5-8 (providing an explication of freedom for intrusion as the pur-
pose the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused).
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the bedrooms of consenting adults engaged in intimate activi-
ties. Another purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to moni-
tor the tendency of states to create social outcasts."' Justice
O'Connor applied this anti-caste principle to invalidate a law
that had dozens of collateral effects for lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals in Texas. "'A legislative classification that threatens
the creation of an underclass ... cannot be reconciled with' the
Equal Protection Clause.""' Justice Kennedy recognized the se-
riousness of Justice O'Connor's analysis and suggested that the
liberty and anti-caste principles were interconnected in Law-
rence." 3 The anti-caste principle could not be deeply enforced
without also enforcing the liberty principle to divest the nation
of consensual sodomy laws." 4
In light of the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Hardwick is doubly problematic. A majority of the
Hardwick Justices were unable to understand how the sexual
intimacies entailed in sodomy were important for gay people,
just as the nonprocreative intimacies were important to the
married couple in Griswold. Once LGBT people are recognized
as decent citizens whose lives count in our society, there is no
good reason why the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty principle
should not protect their intimacies just as it protects the inti-
macies of married (Griswold) and unmarried (Eisenstadt)
straight couples. If Hardwick was wrong in applying the liberty
principle, its mistake was compounded by its reasons. By un-
necessarily focusing on "homosexual sodomy," Justice White's
111. On the anti-caste principle as key to the Framers' original expecta-
tions, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 13-39 (1988).
112. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)).
"Our Constitution ... neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
114. Justice Kennedy reasoned:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so re-
mains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might re-
main even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject ho-
mosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the pri-
vate spheres.
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opinion not only revealed a bias in its application of the liberty
principle, but sanctioned (and perhaps encouraged) state and
private discrimination that exacerbated sodomy laws' tension
with the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-caste principle.
None of this reasoning was persuasive to Justice Scalia
(himself an alumnus of the Legal Process class at Harvard). He
abandoned Justice White's biased rhetoric and error-laden his-
tory, but strongly disputed the majority's historiography. The
historical debate between Justices Kennedy and Scalia is, on
the whole, not a debate over the facts. 5 Like the majority, the
dissent provides what I consider an honest account, along the
following lines: However you reinterpret the history of sodomy
laws, it is apparent that nonprocreative sex was not something
that Americans accepted as valuable or fundamental at the
time of Reconstruction."6 Even during the twentieth century,
when Americans came to accept contraception as a valid means
of avoiding the procreative consequences of penile-vaginal sex,
there remained a normative aversion to other forms of nonpro-
creative sex, namely anal sex (traditional "sodomy") and oral
sex (added to state sodomy laws after 1879). Indeed, there were
203 reported prosecutions for consensual adult homosexual
sodomy between 1880 and 1995, the same period when contra-
ception, and even abortion, became commonplace in American
society.1
7
Justice Kennedy's account is, in my opinion, equally honest
and has the added virtue of understanding the history of sod-
omy laws through the purposive framework of the Fourteenth
Amendment." When the amendment was adopted in 1868,
crime against nature laws were not in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's core principles and purposes. The laws did
not clash with the liberty principle because they were applied
115. Indeed, like Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia closely follows the factual
account developed in the Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 9-17, which was in turn
taken from William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 631, cited in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480, and ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 14, cited in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
116. The account in the text is drawn from Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2492-94
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 375, cited in Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. The account in the text is drawn from Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477-
82, which is the opinion of the Court.
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almost exclusively to coercive sexuality." 9 The laws were origi-
nally not at odds with the anti-caste principle because they
were not associated with any class of people. It was not until
well into the twentieth century that sodomy became a metonym
for a new category of person, the "homosexual," and that sod-
omy laws were widely applied to activities between consenting
adults, in increasing violation of the liberty principle.2 ° Indeed,
sodomy laws were a basis for a massive antihomosexual Kul-
turkampf during the McCarthy era, a state campaign eerily
reminiscent of the Nazi's persecution of gay people and entirely
at odds with the anti-caste principle.'
The core historical disagreement within the Court entailed
the Justices' different interpretations of the Kulturkampf and
its aftermath. Justice Kennedy was attentive to the state's in-
creasing, and historically recent, persecution of consenting gay
adults as the focus of sodomy laws."2 He also found relevant
the judgment of neutral legal experts-the American Law In-
stitute (recommended in 1955) and the Wolfenden Committee
(recommended in 1957)-that the more modern trend of enforc-
ing sodomy laws against consenting adults violated the liberty
principle and had malign rule-of-law effects as well."' In short,
this state-led campaign of persecution hurt good people for no
good reason. Justice Scalia understood the Kulturkampf period
as a confirmation of Hardwick's "conclusion that homosexual
sodomy is not a fundamental right 'deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition.'
124
119. The laws presented a due process problem of adequate notice because
they only named the "abominable and detestable crime against nature" as
their object. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 21 (1973) (per curiam). The
statutory language had well-accepted common law meanings, however, sug-
gesting that these notice problems were not fatal. Id. Note that the accepted
common law gloss on the crime against nature further ensured that the laws
would not be applied to consensual encounters in private places. Cato Brief,
supra note 87, at 12, followed in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479. A man could not
be convicted of the crime against nature without evidence of penetration by his
penis into another man's anus. Id. Moreover, such evidence could not be based
upon the testimony of a sexual partner who was his legal "accomplice." Id.
Conversely, a man could be convicted by evidence presented by a sexual part-
ner who did not consent (such as a woman or man being anally raped) or who
was incapable of consent (a minor girl or boy). See id. at 11-12.
120. See Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 12-14.
121. See id. at 13; ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 57-97.
122. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
123. Id. at 2480-81.
124. Id. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Both Justices Kennedy and Scalia not only engaged the
history of sodomy law evolution both factually and judiciously,
but were also able to get (partly) beyond the level-of-generality
debate noted above. Does a due process claim have to show that
a particular conduct was considered off-limits to state regula-
tion in 1868? Or can the claimant rely on American law's pro-
tection of a more general category of conduct?121 In Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy does not claim that consensual sodomy is a
"fundamental right" affirmatively supported by traditional le-
gal protection, nor does Justice Scalia dispute that consensual
sodomy in private places was unregulated until well into the
twentieth century. Their dispute is openly normative: Given a
history as to which there is now much agreement, how should it
be read? Does the history justify, or help justify, overruling not
only a precedent of the Court, but also invalidating consensual
sodomy laws in thirteen states?
The norm on which one's reading of the history turns is, ul-
timately, the proper status of people who presumptively com-
mit the "homosexual sodomy" that Texas criminalized. While it
may be too simple to say that Justice Kennedy read the history
from the perspective of gay people, and Justice Scalia read it
from the perspective of TFV people, it helps frame their differ-
ent approaches to the same legal materials. Following Hard-
wick, Justice Scalia read the history in a way that helped ex-
plain why Texas might rationally have adopted the
Homosexual Conduct Law. His baseline was the deference to
the normal political process the Court usually affords economic
and much social or morals legislation. 126 Following Romer, Jus-
tice Kennedy's baseline was the norm of tolerable sexual varia-
tion, a norm largely adopted in American politics and law in re-
sponse to the LGBT social movement. 127
The foregoing contrast shows yet another way that the
Court's reading of history contributed to its case that the Ho-
mosexual Conduct Law violates the original meaning of the
125. This was the debate in Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30
(1989). In Lawrence, the debate would have been something like this: As he
did in Michael H., Justice Scalia would have gone to the most specific level
available and argued that sodomy of any kind cannot be a "fundamental right"
because it was regulated in 1868. See id. at 127 & n.6. As he and Justice
O'Connor did in Michael H., Justice Kennedy would have been open to consid-
ering a broader category, like "conduct in the home that does not harm third
parties." See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
126. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 2482.
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Fourteenth Amendment: If, as a matter of social fact, homo-
sexuality is a tolerable condition that poses no discernible
threat to the community, then the nineteenth-century history
of sodomy nonenforcement outside of predatory contexts had it
right, and the twentieth century's episodically hysterical en-
forcement was profoundly unproductive. Once gay people are
understood as rather normal folks who engage in sexual con-
duct for most of the same reasons that straight people do, then
it is hard to say that they should not have the same protection
from state intrusion into their homes and relations that
straight people enjoy. Thus, the Texas law was inconsistent
with the liberty principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like-
wise, Texas's focus on "homosexual conduct" alone, and the ex-
tensive civil consequences of being a presumptive "homosexual
sodomite," is invidious as well as unproductive-a cheap way
for Texas to send a moral message against sodomy, but without
subjecting mainstream heterosexual sodomites to potential
penalties. Demonizing a decent group of citizens is inconsistent
with the anti-caste principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.
My account of how history can support Lawrence is similar
to the accounts that others have posited for the Court's race
and sex discrimination cases. Unlike Lawrence, Brown v. Board
of Education12 8 dodged the historical issues. Most historians
have been skeptical that the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment supported Brown, largely because the Re-
construction Congress and legislators, by their words and by
their statutes, seemed to accept segregated schools and other
institutions.29 Pressed by Justice Frankfurter to provide some
historical justification, his law clerk Alex Bickel examined the
evidence and concluded that the Framers did not expect racial
segregation to end immediately but were open to its ending af-
ter the country assimilated the freed slaves as equal citizens. 3 °
Bickel's account of the history has been an appealing one, even
to constitutional conservatives, because it provides a link be-
tween the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning and
America's normative consensus that racial variation is benign
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
129. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-27, 117-27 (1977);
EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869
(1990).
130. Bickel, supra note 98; see also BORK, supra note 98 (agreeing that
Brown was inconsistent with the Framers' specific intent, but not their gen-
eral intent, i.e., the overall equality purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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and, therefore, that it is irrational to use race as a reason to
segregate people as a matter of law.
III. LAWRENCE, REGIME SHIFTS, AND STARE DECISIS
The previous part argued that a regime shift such as that
initiated in Romer and completed in Lawrence requires the
Court to apply the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning
with some attention to the perspective and citizenship of the
newly recognized social group. I now suggest a similar proposi-
tion for the role of stare decisis: Once a regime shift has oc-
curred, previous decisions must be reconceived or even recon-
sidered if they are tainted by the rejected norm. If a social fact
or norm is the starting point or a key premise in precedents A-
F, and the Supreme Court finds in precedent G that the social
fact is false or the norm has been superseded, then stare decisis
does not apply with much or any force for precedents A-F, even
if they are not overruled in the new precedent.' Indeed, lower
courts--ordinarily required to follow the reasoning as well as
results of Supreme Court opinions-will sometimes ignore or
read those opinions narrowly once the Court has announced a
regime shift. On the other hand, it might be the case that the
social fact or norm is a necessary assumption only of precedent
A, and that precedents B-F can survive, but perhaps in nar-
rowed form.
Brown did not explicitly overrule any precedent of the
Court, but it implicitly (and unmistakably) rejected a founda-
tional proposition followed by a number of the Court's earlier
precedents, namely, that the states could treat racial variation
as so malignant or should treat it as significant, such that they
could order different races to be segregated.32 Brown treated
131. This analysis is consistent with standard accounts of stare decisis and
the conditions under which precedent can be overruled. See HART & SACKS,
supra note 105, at 545-629. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (describing the process of over-
ruling precedents).
132. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown rejected "[any language in
Plessy" inconsistent with the Court's analysis. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
Warren did not have to say more because Plessy's holding had already been
overruled in Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), which inter-
preted the Interstate Commerce Act to prohibit race discrimination, including
segregation, on railroad trains. Brown surely had the effect of overruling cases
like Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899),
and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), both of which assumed the legality
of state segregation in allowing local discretion to make decisions about local
segregated schools. As became clear in the wake of Brown, Warren's opinion
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African-Americans as equal citizens entitled to dignified and
equal treatment as participants in the political community.
Once that norm became the law of the land, in a unanimous
Supreme Court decision, the constitutional world changed.
Lower courts understood that their duty was to reason from the
Brown norm even if it meant departing from circuit court or
even Supreme Court precedent. Although its formal reasoning
focused almost entirely on segregated education, it is for this
reason that lower courts treated Brown as cutting deeply
against any form of apartheid.'33
The Supreme Court itself applied that idea in McLaughlin
v. Florida.3 4 Florida made it a crime for an unmarried couple of
different races to cohabit.' 35 The state defended its law by refer-
ence to Pace v. Alabama,'36 where the Supreme Court had up-
held a law enhancing penalties for adultery and fornication
.137 ht'
when the couple was of different races. Justice White's
McLaughlin opinion gave short shrift to Pace on the ground
that it "represent[ed] a limited view of the Equal Protection
Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent de-
cisions of this Court."'38 The subsequent decisions were, essen-
tially, Brown. Once the Court had signaled that racial variation
was not, itself, a rational basis for state policy and that third-
party effects could not be a rational basis if they were based on
racial prejudice, then Pace lost all its stare decisis effect. The
Court's landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia39 became a
constitutional gimme.
The Court repeated the same pattern in the sex discrimi-
nation cases. Before 1971, the Court had never struck down
statutory sex discrimination on equal protection grounds. Re-
sponding directly to the women's rights movement and its
also effectively abrogated state and federal circuit court decisions allowing ra-
cial segregation outside the education context. See infra note 133 and accom-
panying text.
133. In a series of per curiam opinions, the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed lower court judgments striking down race-based segregation in public
beaches, Mayor of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.), municipal
golf courses, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.), city buses,
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.), and so forth.
134. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
135. Id. at 184.
136. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
137. Id. at 585.
138. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188.
139. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down laws barring different-race mar-
riages).
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overwhelming political success, the Court did so frequently in
the 1970s. The new norm was that sex is usually not a rational
basis for state policies. The old norm allowing states to recog-
nize separate spheres for women and men was repudiated, but
without overruling prior precedents. With one exception,140 the
Court just ignored the earlier precedents 4 The lower courts
got the message, and the earlier decisions disappeared. They
died and went to precedent Hell.
A notable feature of Justice Kennedy's Lawrence opinion is
that Hardwick got a more decent burial than Pace and the pre-
1971 sex discrimination precedents had received. This is good.
McLaughlin would have been a much stronger decision if Jus-
tice White had explained how Brown repudiated as false and
pernicious Pace's essential social norm, that racial variation or
mixing can be malignant.142 Once it was accepted as a matter of
normative fact that different-race relationships were benign
and had no public effects beyond the illegitimate consequences
of private prejudice, it was a serious violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty principle to make them a crime. Once it
was accepted as a matter of normative fact that people of color
are equal citizens and that white racial purity is an irrational
state goal, the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-caste principle
required the invalidation of McLaughlin's discrimination. Un-
der the proper analysis, therefore, Pace was no longer tenable
as a precedent, and was even inconsistent with the original
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, as understood in light
of current social facts and norms.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence heartily ob-
jected to the majority's treatment of precedent. His main claim
was that Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter gave none of
the stare decisis benefit to Hardwick that they had given a dec-
ade before to save Roe. He was right about that, and he was
140. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975), Justice White's opin-
ion for the Court overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), but with little
more reasoning than his opinion in McLaughlin had given for rejecting Pace.
141. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a statute pro-
hibiting bars from serving 3.2% beer to eighteen- to twenty-year-old males but
not to females). Craig ignored but implicitly overruled Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948), which allowed Michigan to bar women from serving as
bartenders. Craig, 429 U.S. at 20 & n.23.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488-91 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia included Justice O'Connor in his charge that the ma-
jority was hypocritically ignoring Casey's analysis of stare decisis. That inclu-
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even righter when he complained that Hardwick had generated
a fair amount of social and legislative reliance that the Court• 1144
ignored. It was also fair to complain that the Lawrence Court
jettisoned one of the key points made in Casey. The joint opin-
ion in Casey announced that stare decisis carries greater weight
"whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls
the contending sides of a national controversy to end their na-
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."14 5 Hardwick can easily be said to call the con-
tending sides of a national controversy to accept the mandate
that it is up to the states to decide whether to criminalize con-
sensual sodomy.
Good for Justice Scalia. But he missed the take-home point
made by the Casey joint opinion, both in its reasoning and in its
result: Stare decisis in identity politics cases is a function of the
social consensus as regards the trait or conduct involved in the
case.' 4' The Casey joint opinion contrasted the Brown Court's
willingness to abrogate the reasoning in Plessy with its own
unwillingness to overrule Roe.' As I have argued above, Plessy
lost its precedential force once public norms had shifted in the
United States.14 8 If racial variation is or must be understood as
benign, it is no longer rational for the state to require racial
segregation. There was no comparable norm shift from Roe to
Casey. If anything, the norm that women are equal citizens
whose interests must be taken into account by constitutional
law was even stronger in 1992 than it had been in 1973, and
sion was patently unfair, as Justice O'Connor, alone on the Court, was scrupu-
lous about stare decisis. Consistent with Casey, she declined to overrule
Hardwick. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent
with Romer, however, she voted to strike down the Texas law on equal protec-
tion grounds. Id. at 2484-87.
144. See id. at 2490-91 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Not only was the
Clinton Administration's statutory exclusion of gay people from military ser-
vice in 1993 explicitly premised and defended on the ground that gay people
are prone to commit illegal consensual sodomy, see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (Supp.
1994); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1129 & n.4, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1997), but state antigay hiring policies, presumptions against child cus-
tody, and adoption rules have been premised and defended on the same basis,
see ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 786-800, 869-72, 879-82 (provid-
ing extensive documentation of antigay employment rules and their defenses);
id. at 1163-76, 1188-94 (documenting antigay family law rules).
145. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992) (joint opin-
ion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
146. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 863-64.
147. Id. at 862-64.
148. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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the right to choose an abortion had gained a powerful new con-
stitutional dimension: Not only do women have a liberty inter-
est in controlling the timing of their childbearing, they also
have an equality interest because this decision bears upon
them in ways that it can never bear upon, or be understood by,
149
men.
Sympathetically understood, the Casey analysis lends sup-
port to Justice Kennedy's thoughtful revisiting of Hardwick.
Like Brown and unlike Casey, Lawrence overruled a precedent
that had been overtaken by a normative revolution in the
United States. Like Brown and unlike Casey, Lawrence was a
moment when the Court was engaging in a regime shift that in
fact required it to overrule precedent. That is what a regime
shift is all about. Indeed, this is the reason why the Court was
right to confront Hardwick head on and not to accept Justice
O'Connor's attractive invitation to respect both stare decisis
and equal gay citizenship by striking down the Texas Homo-
sexual Conduct Law on equal protection rather than due proc-
ess grounds. Justice O'Connor's approach would not only have
left most sodomy laws on the books, but would have left Hard-
wick in place as a symbol of permanent gay inequality. Hard-
wick's "continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homo-
sexual persons."1 50 It also demeaned the Court, whose
legitimacy was perpetually stained so long as Hardwick was on
the books.15'
So Brown, Casey, and Lawrence are all consistent with a
meta-principle of stare decisis in identity-politics cases: Once
national citizenship has expanded to include a new identity
group, and social norms have changed to accept the group's de-
fining trait as at least tolerable, the Court ought to presume in
favor of expanding the liberties and contracting the exclusions
suffered by the once-denigrated group. The Court should do
this not simply because it is just, or even simply because it con-
tributes to the orderly evolution of our pluralist system-but
the Court must do this for its own survival as a neutral arbiter
of the rule of law. A Court perceived as racist, sexist, or (now)
homophobic is a Court that cannot do the business the Consti-
tution charges it with and cannot command the respect of the
lower court judges under its supervision. It will be a Court be-
149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-69.
150. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
151. Id. at 2482-83.
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set with nasty charges, political attacks, and mutinies by lower
court judges, until it accommodates the new group.
The foregoing analysis leaves some questions unanswered.
An important qualification is that identity politics entails more
than just long-subordinated minority groups. Every identity-
based social movement has generated a countermovement that
is equally identity based-the states' rights and white suprem-
acy politics in the wake of Brown,"' the anti-ERA and pro-life
politics following Roe,"' and the TFV politics responding to the
LGBT rights movement.' Social movement theory also pro-
vides a way to understand both the content and the passion of
Justice Scalia's Lawrence dissent: There are powerful issues of
citizenship and identity on both sides of the case, and in such
instances the Court should leave culture clashes to the political
process.15 Anything more is illegitimate judicial activism that
will harm the minority groups the Justices are trying to pro-
tect.
Indeed, the political fallout from both Brown and Roe sug-
gests that even regime-shifting precedents cannot implement
new norms when identity politics is evenly balanced. In Brown
II, the Court rejected the Inc. Fund's request for immediate im-
plementation of the antiapartheid rule of Brown 1.156 Although
the Court gave greater bite to Brown If remedies between 1963
and 1971, after 1971 a Court more responsive to Northern op-
position to busing curtailed Brown II remedies."7 A moderate
politics of preservation has been able to limit federal court
regulation of local public education. One consequence of lim-
152. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2096-2113.
153. See id. at 2138-59.
154. See id. at 2179-94.
155. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that homosexuals should "promot[e] their agenda through normal democractic
means").
156. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
157. For examples of the Court expanding Brown II remedies see McDaniel
v. Baresi, 402 U.S. 309 (1971) and Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). For examples of the Court curtailing Brown II
remedies see Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527
(1982) and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
158. The moderate version of the politics of preservation rejects explicitly
racist rhetoric but favors policies that allow either segregation or resegrega-
tion as a matter of private choices. Richard Nixon was elected President essen-
tially on this platform. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 326-31, 349-51, 386-99 (1995);
2004] 1063
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ited judicial intervention and patterns of white flight has been
a steady resegregation of American public education.5 9
The reactions to Roe were even more dramatic. The Su-
preme Court's decision gave a tremendous boost to the nascent
pro-life social movement.' Although that countermovement
has not been able to persuade Americans that the fetus is a
human person, it has persuaded most Americans that the
choice to have an abortion is one that the state can regulate in
many respects. 6' The success of the pro-life movement was ap-
parent in Casey. Although the joint opinion reaffirmed the "es-
sential holding" of Roe, it abandoned the trimester framework
and applied Justice O'Connor's undue burden test to uphold a
state law requiring waiting periods, informational disclosures,
and (for minors) parental consent before exercising one's choice
to have an abortion.
162
IV. LAWRENCE AND A CONSERVATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE
This part considers exactly what the Court was accom-
plishing as a normative matter. The answer involves an inquiry
DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS 15-43 (2001). Nixon's four ap-
pointments to the Court (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.) im-
plemented that platform limiting Brown II remedies after 1973. See JEFFRIES,
supra note 54, at 302-331.
159. See GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIV., RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1999), http://www.civilrights
project.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Resegregation AmericanSchools99.pdf.
160. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE
RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIREY PROTEST 51-60 (1994).
161. "Americans in general have embraced both the right to abortion de-
clared by the Court as well as many restrictions Roe v. Wade allowed."
GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1996, at 114 (1997);
see id. at 112 (noting that at least 70% of respondents favored waiting periods,
required disclosures, parental consent, and spousal notification for women
seeking abortions); GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
2002, at 20 (2003) (noting that 78% of respondents said abortion laws should
remain the same or be more strict).
162. The joint opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens in reaffirming the essential
holding of Roe and striking down the state spousal notification law. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 911-22 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in judgment, and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice and Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas joined the joint opinion in upholding the remainder
of the law, as described in the text accompanying this note. Id. at 944-79
(Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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into toleration. The new constitutional floor set by the Ro-
merlLawrence regime shift is that states must treat homo-
sexuality as a tolerable variation; implicitly, this new floor does
not require that states treat homosexuality as equivalent to
heterosexuality, but it does veto state discretion to treat LGBT
people as outlaws or degenerates. The political philosophy sup-
porting that new floor is a jurisprudence of tolerance. Underly-
ing that jurisprudence is not only the moral philosophy notion
of tolerable variation, but also the political philosophy notion
that mutual toleration is necessary for the flourishing (or even
the survival) of a pluralist democracy.
A. LAWRENCE AND THE NORM OF TOLERABLE VARIATION
The results in Romer and Lawrence are consistent with the
norm that homosexuality is a tolerable sexual variation, and
their reasoning is more consistent with this norm than with the
more gay-friendly idea that homosexuality is a benign sexual
variation. Libertarian analyses of sodomy laws, from Jeremy
Bentham through H.L.A. Hart and Richard Posner, have tradi-
tionally distanced the protected conduct from standards of mo-
rality."3 Thus, a lot of disapproved conduct can be tolerated,
especially if it does not hurt other people. Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence treats homosexual conduct with careful re-
spect, but also considerable moral distance.
A contrast makes this point. Justice Douglas's opinion for
the Court in Griswold protected the right of married couples to
use contraceptives. His opinion concluded with a lavish ode to
heterosexual marriage:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not po-
litical faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet
it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.'
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence concluded on a flat-
ter tone: "The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve [lack of consent]. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution .... The case does involve two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
163. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 535-38 (1989) (explaining
how moral views are separated from protected conduct).
164. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.' 65 This is the tone
of both tolerance and moral distance. To some it is a tone of
condescension: Straights have "sacred" and "noble" marriage;
"homosexuals" have a "lifestyle."
The distinction between tolerable and benign variation also
helps us to situate Romer and Lawrence in our constitutional
history and to understand the magnitude of the regime shift
these decisions created. Two rough analogies come to mind, and
they complement one another. The first analogy is to Roe, the
second is to Brown.
Like the Court's opinion in Lawrence, the Roe opinion pro-
tected the freedom of Americans to make sexual choices and
took no moral position on the value of different choices. The
pro-life movement vigorously maintained that Roe was wrongly
decided and that abortion was a malignant moral choice, essen-
tially murder.'66 That countermovement was not able to per-
suade Americans that abortion is equivalent to murder; most
Americans agreed that an abortion was a tolerable moral
choice, such that the state could ordinarily not make it a crime.
But many or most agreed with the critics that abortionwas not
a benign or good moral choice, such that the state must support
or "promote" it. In Maher v. Roe,' the Supreme Court ruled
that it is perfectly constitutional for state medicaid programs to
exclude abortions even if they fund childbirths. Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court interpreted Roe as protecting women
against "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy"-a freedom from
state "compulsion" that did not entitle women to have their
abortions paid for by the state.16 "There is a basic difference be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and
state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
165. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
166. See BLANCHARD, supra note 160.
167. 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977). See also Maher's companion cases, Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (per curiam) (a municipal hospital providing
childbirth services was not constitutionally required to provide abortion ser-
vices) and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (interpreting Title XIX of the
Social Security Act to allow states to participate in Medicaid without funding
abortions). The Court followed and applied Maher to uphold a federal bar to
spending federal monies on abortions in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326
(1980).
168. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977)).
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legislative policy."16 9 The state has wide latitude not to "pro-
mote abortion" by funding it, and Powell's opinion concluded
that this is precisely the sort of policy issue best left to the de-
mocratically elected legislators. 7 °
Maher encouraged pro-life activists to press for laws dis-
couraging abortion as a choice, including requirements that
abortions be performed only after doctors obtain the written
consent of their patients, 7' and that the consent be "informed"
by pro-life information the doctors were required to provide.
The Supreme Court rebuffed early efforts but acquiesced in Ca-
sey. Although the joint opinion reaffirmed the "essential hold-
ing" of Roe, it applied the Maher undue burden test to uphold a
state law requiring waiting periods, informational disclosures,
and (for minors) parental consent before exercising one's choice
to have an abortion.
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It is only in retrospect that we can understand Brown as
representing the triumph of the NAACP's norm of benign racial
variation. Chief Justice Warren's decision tightly focused on
the importance of public education as a training ground for citi-
zenship and the dignitary harms visited on black schoolchil-
dren who were the obvious targets of segregation. 73 The deci-
sion said nothing about race as a presumptively inadmissible
classification across the board.'74 Immediately after Brown, the
Court had an opportunity to take that step. In Naim v. Naim,
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld that state's law making dif-
ferent-race marriage a crime. The Supreme Court remanded
the case for the state court to reconsider in light of Brown.171
Virginia stuck to its original position, which was that different-
race marriage would yield a "mongrel race" and dilute the
169. Id. at 475. Powell contrasted a law barring schools from teaching
German, invalidated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with a policy
of prescribing a curriculum that included English and excluded German with-
out imposing a criminal sanction on those who do not follow such a prescribed
curriculum. Maher, 432 U.S. at 476-77.
170. Id. at 479-80; see id. at 481-82 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (same).
171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 85 (1976)
(containing Missouri's version of such a law).
172. See supra note 162.
173. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
174. The Court simply held that "in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
175. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and re-
manding 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
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white race. 176 There could have been no clearer repudiation of
the idea that racial variation is benign, yet the Supreme Court
allowed the decision to stand. The apparent reason was the fu-
rious reaction in the South to Brown and the equivocal support
the Court was receiving from Congress and the President.
As time passed, however, the country moved toward the
NAACP's point of view. During the Kennedy-Johnson Admini-
stration, the high tide of liberalism in the United States, the
Court constitutionalized the norm that racial variation is be-
nign. In McLaughlin v. Florida,"' the Court struck down a law
making it a crime for an unmarried couple of different races to
cohabit. The Court's landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia
17 8
finally disposed of the issue the Court had ducked in Naim v.
Naim. Chief Justice Warren's opinion not only ruled that the
state could not prohibit different-race marriage, but also estab-
lished once and for all that race is a suspect classification."'
This latter point was a corollary of the Inc. Fund's view: If ra-
cial variation is benign, then state policy based on it is fishy
and presumptively derived from the racist philosophy of "white
supremacy," the announced policy of the Virginia miscegena-
tion law.
Romer and Lawrence accomplished for LGBT people essen-
tially what Brown accomplished for people of color and Roe ac-
complished for women: Homosexuality is a tolerable sexual
variation, and homosexual sodomy is tolerable conduct. Thus,
the state can neither declare that gay people are an outlaw
class, nor enforce an apartheid regime upon gay people.' What
176. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
177. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
178. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
179. Id. at 12.
180. The term in the text does not suggest that the state's denial of jobs
and parental rights to LGBT people is equivalent to the violent regime of
apartheid in the South. I am using the term "apartheid" in its literal sense, as
an interlocking regime of legally enforced segregations. Women in the twenti-
eth century were subjected to an apartheid of the household: The state made it
hard for them to obtain university educations and find well-paying jobs and
legally made it much more advantageous for the average woman to marry a
man-with the result that women were largely segregated from public life.
Gay people suffered under what I call an "apartheid of the closet," whereby the
state enforced a code of not only silence, but also forced performances of het-
erosexuality in its rules against sodomy, state employment of or military ser-
vice by "homosexuals and other sex perverts," and custody by gay parents over
their own children. This argument is developed in ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra
note 14, at 17-80.
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comes next is not predictable. Parallel to the claims made by
people of color and their representatives in the NAACP, LGBT
communities and their representatives in Lambda Legal and
the ACLU maintain that homosexuality is a benign sexual
variation and that homosexual sodomy is benign conduct. Gay
is Good, not just Tolerable. Brown offers gay people hope that
this moral vision will prevail. Parallel to the claims made by
pro-life people and moderate segregationists, TFV communities
and their legal representatives maintain that homosexuality
and homosexual conduct are either bad or unfortunate varia-
tions from an excellent norm, procreative marriage. Gay is God
Awful and at most Tolerable. No promo homo. Casey offers tra-
ditionalists hope that this moral vision can prevail.
B. POLITICAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Lawrence majority had a good handle on traditional
legal materials, including original meaning and precedent.
There are two sides to the rule-of-law issues, however, and Jus-
tice Scalia capably articulated the dissenting point of view. At
the very least, the majority was exercising some discretion in
how it read the materials, with Justice O'Connor reading them
more narrowly and Justice Kennedy more broadly-but both
much more broadly in favor of gay rights than Justice Scalia.
Broad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment always put the
Supreme Court at some risk, and premature enunciations of
constitutional rights (as in Roe) can roil the political and the
judicial process for generations. On the other hand, excessively
stingy readings also put the Court at risk, for dismissive treat-
ment of rights important to an increasingly significant minority
can embroil the Court in never-ending controversy (as in
Hardwick). In short, the Court in these identity-politics cases
must steer a careful course between Scylla (Roe) and Charybdis
(Hardwick).
So we return to the question: Why would the Lawrence ma-
jority read the legal materials in such a progay way? Were they
simply protecting a group because they and their elite friends
are wild about homosexuals as the cause du jour? Justice Scalia
says that this is exactly what the Court is doing."" Don't be-
lieve it. There is no reason to think that Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony Kennedy, staunchly conservative Republicans,
181. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496-97 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
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are pimps for the "homosexual agenda." A better theory is that
these Justices are apostles of toleration, and that they read the
Fourteenth Amendment to support that norm for a social group
consisting of decent Americans who have traditionally been de-
spised by their neighbors and mistreated by the state. The best
theory, and one that complements the second, is a political the-
ory, rooted in American history. It is not only consistent with,
but is suggested by, the original purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This theory provides a compass for the Supreme
Court to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis. The central point of
the political theory is that the Court should operate to lower
the stakes of identity politics and culture clashes. The Court's
moderating role is especially important when warring identity
groups threaten to radicalize politics.
The modern Constitution is premised upon the operation of
a democratic pluralism. Three features of our government are
key. One is that elected representatives who are accountable to
voters make most public policy, the representation feature. At
the state and national level, representatives in two different
(and differently accountable) chambers have to approve pro-
posals before they can become law. A second feature is the im-
portance of groups. Parties contend for votes and loyalty, but so
do other kinds of groups, including identity-based groups like
LGBT people and TFV people. This is the pluralism feature of
our government. Finally, our representative democracy is en-
riched by the fact that most policy making is accomplished at
the state and local level. This federalism feature means that at
any given time people deeply unhappy with the policies fol-
lowed by their home jurisdiction will have the opportunity to
move to friendlier states or cities.
Before the New Deal, most accounts of judicial review as-
sumed that the Supreme Court and the judiciary had little or
no role to play in the operation of the democratic process. 182 Re-
sponding to the NAACP's stream of criminal procedure and vot-
ing cases, the New Deal Court suggested that it was prepared
to be a referee for the political process, not only (1) when the
process violated individual rights clearly protected in the
Constitution, but also (2) when local political elites sought to
182. Most theories simply focused on the Court's enforcement of objectively
identifiable rights. The most sophisticated theory focusing on judicial review
and the democratic process maintained that any kind of judicial activism
weakened the democratic process. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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lock in their power by excluding minorities from participation,
or (3) when laws were motivated by "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities" such that the ordinary political process
could not be relied on.'8 3 This theory suggests that the Supreme
Court should generally not strike down statutes that are the
product of a normally functioning democratic process, one
where all relevant groups participate freely (even if not with
equal success). Judicial review, under this theory, should be ex-
ceptional, limited to cases involving self-perpetuating majori-
ties and minorities that are systematically excluded.
Such a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review
could support invalidating the Texas Homosexual Conduct
Law.8 The law imposed unique disabilities on a discrete and
insular minority (gay people) who have long been demonized in
the Texas political process. Before 1973, Texas made it a felony
for anyone to engage in consensual sodomy.18 5 By 1973, it was
apparent to some legislators that sodomy, oral sex in particu-
lar, was widespread in the state, but almost no one would ad-
mit to such conduct, for religious or social shame reasons.
There were relatively few gay people in the state, and so their
interests could be entirely ignored. Under such circumstances,
it was a natural compromise to do what Texas did in 1973-
decriminalize consensual heterosexual sodomy and maintain
consensual homosexual sodomy as a crime. 88 This sent a politi-
cally acceptable set of signals, but at the expense of a minority.
The product of an unrepresentative process, the Homosexual
Conduct Law could remain in effect not just because it is hard
for any group to repeal legislation, but also because the private
and public discrimination that the law encouraged against
openly gay people kept most of them in the closet, and thereby
politically marginalized them even more effectively.
This is a dysfunctional process, and its dysfunctions bear
some similarity to those that disadvantaged African-Americans
in the twentieth century. Just as apartheid was a legal signal
that people of color were social outcasts, so the Homosexual
183. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see
Bixby, supra note 28. The famous Carolene Products footnote 4 was the basis
for the equally famous "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review
defended in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely also sug-
gested the referee model for judicial review. Id. at 73-104.
184. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003).
185. 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 112 (making it a felony to engage in non-
procreative "carnal copulation").
186. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399 § 21.06.
2004] 1071
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Conduct Law was a legal signal that gay people were outlaws.
Both groups were unfairly treated as pariah groups, and the
laws key to their pariah status exemplify the kinds of cases
where a representation-reinforcing Court might intervene.
"[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbi-
trary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally."1
87
The foregoing account is one way to justify Lawrence
against Justice Scalia's charge that the Court should have left
the matter to the Texas legislature. But the argument lends
more support to Justice O'Connor's proposition that the Texas
law be invalidated on equal protection grounds, than to Justice
Kennedy's proposition that all consensual sodomy laws violate
due process protections. So not only does Justice O'Connor's po-
sition best reflect the constraints of stare decisis, but it is also
most faithful to representation-reinforcement theories of judi-
cial review.
There is another way of thinking about judicial review that
lends more support to Justice Kennedy's opinion. In addition to
local lock-ins and prejudice-based discriminations, a third prob-
lem with pluralist democracy is that its stakes can get too high.
This is a particular problem when groups hate or demonize one
another, the classic culture-clash scenario. In the modern regu-
latory state, an early impulse of a dominant social group that
hates a minority group is to deploy the apparatus of the state
against the minority. One brutal example of this scenario is the
Kulturkampf, where the state seeks to erase a minority or co-
erce it into conformity through a campaign of terror, criminal
prosecutions, and forfeitures for disobedience.'88 Less brutal ex-
amples involve interference with the minority's institutions or
harassment of individuals in the minority.
It is dangerous for the state to take such decisive sides in
culture clashes. By brutalizing or even just harassing minori-
ties, the state feeds their anger, which can be embittering for
187. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
188. The original Kulturkampf was Chancellor Bismarck's effort to domes-
ticate the Roman Catholic Church in Imperial Germany. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411, 2414 (1997). At about the same time, the United States was involved in
a Kulturkampf against the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints.
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the minority, dangerous for the majority (because it feeds their
moral smugness), and destabilizing for the democracy. Angry
minorities will tend to go outside the political process to vent
their anger against the majority, or the state itself. Violence
becomes a stronger possibility. The nightmare result is the
Game of Chicken, where each group keeps raising the stakes of
their conflict, with disastrous results for both sides (and the
general public). 9 From a social point of view, this is a very bad
game for Americans to be engaged in. If played repeatedly, it
raises the stakes and the costs of culture clashes exponentially.
If the escalation is not stopped, the Game of Chicken can de-
stroy the conditions for democracy itself.'90
C. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE
Going beyond representation-reinforcement theory, one
might speculate that the Supreme Court might play a construc-
tive role in managing culture clashes to minimize their threat
to pluralist democracy. To understand how this is a conserva-
tive political theory that would be attractive to Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor, we need to expand our horizon beyond
Lawrence and Romer and examine other instances of vigorous
judicial activism that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (and
Scalia) willingly joined.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group,' a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a Massachu-
setts law barring sexual orientation discrimination by public
accommodations could not constitutionally be applied to the
Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade. The parade organizers sought
to present a particular, generally traditionalist point of view,
and the presence of an openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual march-
ing group would detract from that point of view. 192 Accordingly,
the Court held that the law, as applied, violated the Speech
189. In the classic Game of Chicken, two young males with more testoster-
one than brains drive hot rods on a collision course toward one another, at es-
calating speeds. The first to swerve is the "loser." If both swerve, they are both
"losers." If neither swerves, they are both "totaled."
190. Cf ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-37 (1991)
(noting that democracy is a self-enforcing equilibrium only so long as all
groups see themselves better off under democracy than they would be under a
state of nature).
191. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
192. See id. at 572-73.
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Clause of the First Amendment.9 In Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, T'4 a divided Court extended Hurley to invalidate the ap-
plication of a similar antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court found that the
Boy Scouts were an expressive association whose normative "no
promo homo" message would be undermined by the presence of
an openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster.' In short, the
First Amendment protects the rights of private parades (Hur-
ley) and associations (Dale) to express TFV attitudes through
excluding gays.
To understand the jurisprudence of Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, one must understand Dale and Hurley as well as
Lawrence and Romer.'96 A Court that decides Dale and Hurley
is not a Court that has swallowed the "homosexual agenda."
But a Court that decides Romer and Lawrence as well as Hur-
ley and Dale is a Court that has accepted an activist role in
managing culture clashes. I now maintain that this is a produc-
tive role for the Court.
1 9 7
All four decisions can be justified by a theory drawn from a
193. See id. at 581.
194. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
195. The Boy Scouts' message did not become clear until their reply brief
was filed with the Supreme Court. There, the Scouts opined that they did not
want to "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior" to
their charges, and that having an openly gay scoutmaster would send that
message. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000) (No. 99-699); see Brief for Petitioners at 21, id. (describing the Boy
Scouts' original message was that it wanted to be completely neutral, neither
"anti-gay" nor conveying "approval of homosexual conduct either"). Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion found the Scouts' message too unclear to merit
First Amendment protection. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665-78 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
196. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were the only members of the Court
in the majority for all four cases. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer were in the majority of all but Dale. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas voted against rights for gay people in each of the four
cases.
197. I should note that I have reservations about the reasoning in Hurley,
and both the result and the reasoning in Dale. These decisions reflect a most
imperial First Amendment, but as precedents of the Court, they are of course
the law of the land. Moreover, context makes a big difference. If read only with
Hardwick as background, Hurley and (especially) Dale can easily be read to
reflect a Court that is simply hostile to gay people-allowing intolerant states
to put them in jail and deny them all manner of civil rights, and thwarting the
efforts of tolerant states to assure gay people access to public accommodations.
Once Lawrence and Romer replace Hardwick as the relevant background,
however, Hurley and (even) Dale can be read as signals that the Court will
protect both gay people and traditionalists where the Constitution requires.
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legal process reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's original
meaning. Recall that the original purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment were to guarantee the rule of law for all persons,
to recognize a libertarian presumption against state intrusion
into our privacy, and to militate against class or caste legisla-
tion. Rather than thinking about these purposes in the context
of gay people's emergence as an accepted identity group in
American politics, as I did above, consider how these purposes
help us think about the constitutional politics of culture
clashes.
These Fourteenth Amendment principles suggest a conser-
vative judicial strategy for dealing with culture clashes when
they involve state action. Judicial review enforcing these prin-
ciples is not only faithful to the Framers' design, but plays a
productive role in the political management of culture clashes.
Under what I call a jurisprudence of tolerance, the role of judi-
cial review is threefold: (1) to lower the political stakes of cul-
ture clashes; (2) to assure each group an opportunity to flourish
and, indeed, to demonstrate that its normative program is a
good one; and (3) to channel group disputes through the state
rather than through private violence.
1. Lowering the Stakes of Identity Politics
Culture clashes threaten to raise the stakes of politics, al-
lowing the (temporarily) dominant group not only to enshrine
its philosophy into public policy, but also to impose deep and
harmful costs on the minority. The Fourteenth Amendment is
fundamentally set against this. Its rule of law and anti-caste
purposes promise all groups that laws will be applied generally,
evenly, and fairly. Laws motivated by a desire to hurt a group
are inconsistent with these values and lack even a rational ba-
sis. Moreover, the libertarian principle in the Fourteenth
Amendment augurs against legislation that deprives a minority
of important freedoms without strong justification in the le-
gitimate needs of the overall community.
A Supreme Court that firmly but evenhandedly enforces
these purposes can lower the stakes of culture-clash politics.
Some traditionalists despise gay people, and many traditional-
ists wish there were fewer openly gay people in the public cul-
ture, but the Court in Romer told them, "You cannot take away
these people's basic civil rights." In Lawrence, the Court told
them, "You cannot put these people in jail or treat them as pre-
sumptive outlaws." But the Dale Court told them, "And neither
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can gay people do bad things to you. Your youth group is a safe
place for you to express and inculcate your values, and it goes
without saying that your home, your church, your parochial
school, your other normative associations are all enclaves
where the state cannot impose politically correct or progay val-
ues on you." To LGBT people who do not like the result in Dale,
the Court has this to say, "You wouldn't like it if the state re-
quired your newspapers, churches, and bars to be completely
open to traditionalists. Give them their space-and then try to
persuade your local community that youth groups should not be
afraid of gay leaders."
This jurisprudence lowers the stakes of identity politics in
several ways. First, it takes away big weapons from the com-
batants. Each group is disabled from using the state to harm
people in the other group at a deep level. Second, it prevents
people in each group from feeling frustrated that they are pre-
vented from getting out their message. Third, these cases press
each group toward arguments and rhetoric that emphasize the
positive (here is what we believe) rather than the negative
(those people are squalid). By lowering the stakes of politics,
the Court is creating spaces in which two conflicting groups can
coexist, and maybe learn to tolerate one another. If they never
learn to tolerate one another, the Court will not let them hurt
one another, especially through state action.
Consider a homely analogy, the family. Assume religious
parents who teach all their children that marriage is the only
proper forum for sexual expression. One of their six children is
a lesbian and explains her situation to the family. The parents
might counsel her and might even engage in subtle pressure for
her to consider dating boys.' 98 But it would be very bad parent-
ing for them to expel the lesbian daughter from their house, to
lock her up in the basement until she "changes" her sexual ori-
entation or agrees to undergo reparative therapy, or even to
stigmatize the daughter as a disappointment in contrast to the
straight kids.
The last point is the hardest to justify, but the most impor-
tant. By stigmatizing the lesbian daughter, the parents are not
only hurting her, they are hurting the family's harmony and
198. For example, if the lesbian's sister marries a man, the parents might
not only put on a fabulous religious wedding, but also donate a generous wed-
ding gift to the bride and groom. The suggestion could be that the lesbian sis-
ter will not receive such a remunerative send-off if she marries or cohabits
with another woman.
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probably their straight children as well. The other children will
tend to take sides, and depending on the intensity of the par-
ents' disapproval, they will harbor bitterness toward one an-
other. Child A, who follows the parents' wishes, will become es-
tranged from his sister. Child B, who values the lesbian sister,
may become estranged from Child A and embittered at his par-
ents for subjecting the sister to their disapproval. Child C may
turn her rage on the lesbian sister. And so forth. Intolerance
turns this hypothetical family into a hornet's nest of resent-
ments and hurt.
Most successful families operate upon a principle of toler-
ance that takes the edge off of normative disagreements within
the family. "She is my sister, and I love her, even though I do
not understand her lifestyle" is an attitude that ennobles both
persons and enables them to contribute to the welfare of the
family. Tolerance is an admirable trait. An instrumentalist jus-
tification for tolerance is that it enables different people to co-
operate productively with one another in an institutional set-
ting-not just the family, but also the state.
2. Protecting Normative Groups and Their Ability
to Proselytize
A corollary of the first idea (lowering the stakes of identity
politics) is to assure each clashing group an opportunity to per-
suade the community of its normative agenda. Here, the Four-
teenth Amendment values complement established First
Amendment values.199 The libertarian norm of the Fourteenth
Amendment works with the anticensorship presumption of the
First Amendment to create a "super norm" that states cannot
limit identity speech and cannot cut off the flow of ideas, even if
contentious. When the state is forcing a particular viewpoint
through its censorship, the Constitution is especially vigilant,
even as to some state spending programs as well as criminal
laws. Here, the anti-caste norm of the Fourteenth Amendment
reinforces the First Amendment rule against viewpoint dis-
crimination, even in cases where the state can engage in some
content regulation.
Last but not least important, the Fourteenth Amendment's
rule-of-law norm finds the happiest of parallels in the First
199. Of course, the First Amendment's Speech Clause was one of the first
provisions of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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Amendment, which has on the whole been a model of neutral
constitutionalism. The lesbian is happy that she can read femi-
nist theory and can join with other women and gay men in as-
sociations that have meaning for her, all without state censor-
ship and harassment. The Baptist is happy that she can read
biblical works and can join with other religious people to wor-
ship and share the Word, also without state meddling. Each
might be tempted to regulate the other: The lesbian finds the
Baptist's denunciation of homosexuality as "an abomination to
God" hate speech that sets a bad example for her children; the
Baptist finds the lesbian's open cohabitation with another
woman to be sinful conduct that sets a bad example for her
children. Yet each accepts that her own freedom requires her to
respect the freedom of her sister. One might say that the twen-
tieth century produced a huge First Amendment logroll where
everyone is most delighted that he or she can speak out and as-
sociate freely and accepts the same freedoms for speech and as-
sociation he or she does not like.
3. Channeling Group Disputes and Domesticating Culture
Clashes
The core rule-of-law role for the state is to maintain order
and to prevent the havoc characteristic in a state of nature.
Having an independent judiciary contributes to this conserva-
tive project by channeling group disputes into government
processes rather than into private ones (like feuds and other
institutions characteristic of the dreaded state of nature). For
channeling to work, each group in a normative contest must be-
lieve that judges will not be biased against its members and
will give it a fair shake.
Channeling works at the level of rhetoric as well as con-
duct. Activist (but not too activist) judicial review can help do-
mesticate culture clashes. By requiring each group in a culture
clash to tone down its denigrating rhetoric, judicial review do-
mesticates their conflict insofar as it occurs in the political
arena. The domestication of culture clashes is important in
maintaining the advantages of political pluralism-moderation,
stability, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Judicial re-
view helps social groups avoid mutually destructive Games of
Chicken. This is a big boon for the modern regulatory state.
This triple role ofjudicial review-lowering stakes, protect-
ing expression, and channeling-helps us understand why
Hardwick was such a bad decision. It raised the stakes of poli-
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tics because it reaffirmed the power of the state to brand homo-
sexuals as criminals, and did so in an opinion that went out of
its way to disrespect gay people.200 The collateral consequences
of presumptive criminality were quite significant in some
states. Together, this was a legal regime designed to marginal-
ize gay people socially and politically by keeping them out of
those states or confining them to the closet. Given the greater
tolerance they had come to expect from modern government in
Canada, the United States, and Europe, gay people were an-
gered by Hardwick. Its transparently antigay motivation
threatened the neutrality of the Court in matters of sexuality,
gender, and the law.
Just as the jurisprudence of tolerance supports Lawrence,
so too does it lend support to both Hurley and Dale. A state that
tells a traditionalist association whom it can admit and what
message it sends is a state that is raising the stakes of politics.
Even (or especially) politically correct censorship generates an-
ger, and the Court was right to erase the censorship. When the
state imposes a conformist agenda on people's core liberties-
private sexual activities, associational freedoms, self-
expression, the practice of religion-it poses great risks of rais-
ing the stakes of the culture clash, of preventing one group
from having a fair chance to make its case to Americans, and of
driving some groups or some members to private violence.
A corollary of the jurisprudence of tolerance is that there
are strong limits to judicial activism. Indeed, the jurisprudence
of tolerance cautions against hasty or premature activism that
raises rather than lowers the stakes of politics. This was the
central problem with Roe. Although its protection of a woman's
right to choose an abortion was supported by both the libertar-
ian and anti-caste norms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
sweeping nature and the early timing of the Court's opinion
200. Justice White's most obvious sin was his obsessive, and unfounded,
focus on "homosexual sodomy," but more deeply insulting to LGBT people was
his dismissal of their heartfelt and deep normative claims as, "at best, face-
tious." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). That White's dismissal came at the end of a
historical discussion that was factually erroneous and analytically sloppy sig-
naled not just that the Court was biased against gays, but that it was smug in
its confidence that it did not even have to explore gay people's constitutional
arguments and history with any degree of seriousness. "Of course we're igno-
rant of those people's history. Why should we waste our time?" This was a
deeply unprofessional message for the Court to be sending to a group that had
been persecuted by the state, but was demonstrating to America that its
members were productive citizens whose claims had to be taken seriously.
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struck many as inconsistent with the rule-of-law norm and the
orderly operation of the democratic process.2°' In 1973, more
than a dozen states had just liberalized their nineteenth-
century abortion laws, and four of those states had completely
deregulated abortion.0 2 Most other states were considering
abortion law reform, and there is every reason to believe that a
large majority of states would have accomplished reform in the
1970s-on their own and without any direct pressure from the
Supreme Court.0 3
It is not clear that Texas would have modernized its law,
which was the law reviewed in Roe. Adopted in the nineteenth
century (before women had the right to vote), the Texas law
was the most sweeping in the country, making abortion a crime
unless necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. Jus-
tice Blackmun's initial draft opinion would have invalidated
the law on vagueness grounds; it gave neither doctors nor pa-
tients adequate guidance as to when they could perform the
procedure.20 ' Although his colleagues insisted that Justice
Blackmun draft a more substantive opinion, my theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the initial draft was the
better one, for it would have swept away the most obsolescent
laws without foreclosing state reregulation that could then
have been reviewed upon a more complete record. In short, it
would not have raised the stakes of abortion politics and in fact
would have returned that politics to state legislatures, which
would have reached a series of compromises and accommoda-
tions.
By taking most abortion-related policy issues away from
the political process and disrespecting the pro-life position, the
Court raised the stakes (the intensity) of pro-life politics even
more than Hardwick would do in the next decade. Mark this
201. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-29
(1975); BORK, supra note 98, at 111-16.
202. Mary C. Segers & Timothy A. Byrnes, Introduction to ABORTION
POLITICS IN AMERICAN STATES 1, 2-4 (Mary C. Segers & Timothy A. Byrnes
eds., 1995).
203. See generally GARROW, supra note 32, at 335-88 (describing state de-
velopments in abortion law reform before Roe).
204. See Drafts and Memorandum regarding Roe v. Wade (on file at the Li-
brary of Congress, Madison Building, Papers of William 0. Douglas, Container
1590) (including Justice Douglas's notes on the first Roe conference, as well as
Justice Blackmun's original draft vagueness opinion and Justice White's
strong dissent, and memos from the other majority Justices urging Blackmun
to go beyond the vagueness rationale).
1080 [Vol 88:1021
JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE
irony. Richard Nixon appointed the Burger Court Justices as
strict constructionists who would avoid the activism of the
Warren Court. Falling athwart both Scylla (Roe) and Charybdis
(Hardwick), the Burger Court was one of the politically clumsi-
est Courts in our nation's history. Led by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, the Rehnquist Court has been politically much
more adept, just as it has been even more activist. Casey undid
some of the pluralism damage of Roe-affirming a substantial
leeway for the states to regulate abortions even as a majority
symbolically reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe. Lawrence
and Romer undid most of the pluralism damage of Hardwick-
but without making the mistake of getting too far ahead of the
country. These Justices have charted a successful course, so
far, between Scylla and Charybdis.
Shoals lurk in murky waters ahead, however. The judiciary
ought not, and really cannot for an extended period of time,
disrupt a nationwide normative equilibrium on important po-
litical issues. Thus, if almost all Americans despise and fear
"homosexuals," as they did in the 1950s, the courts cannot
change that hatred and fear and cannot impose a regime of
equal treatment of the despised minority, though they can slow
down any deployment of state apparatus to destroy the minor-
ity. The country's ho-hum reaction to the demise of sodomy
laws supports the universal surmise that these old antigay atti-
tudes have changed, but the alarm in most of the country to the
possibility of same-sex marriage suggests that public attitudes
have not completely reversed themselves.
The current political equilibrium in the United States is
that homosexuality is not a malignant condition and is, in fact,
a tolerable variation. But it is a tolerable variation from the
norm of heterosexuality, which for most Americans is clearly
the best sexual orientation and one the state should favor.
These are not attitudes that the judiciary can change, and judi-
cial challenges to these attitudes would be futile, perhaps even
counterproductive. If most Americans believe that gay people
are harmless misfits but not qualified for the elevated status of
civil marriage, the judiciary not only cannot, but ought not, im-
pose same-sex marriage on the hesitant body politic. To do so
would inflame the culture clash and raise the stakes of politics.
V. REGIME SHIFTS AND SLIPPERY SLOPES:
THE END OF MORALS REGULATION?
Every regime shift threatens a slippery slope. Once the
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Court calls a prior normative understanding into constitutional
question, once-settled issues will be open for rethinking and re-
litigation. This includes not just obvious issues, but also collat-
eral issues, because lawyers have every incentive to press any
envelope that the Court might reopen. So Brown not only
opened up two generations of litigation over racial segregation
in public schools, but also triggered constitutional challenges to
racial segregation of other state and municipal facilities and
services, to state laws barring or criminalizing different-race
sexual relations and marriage, to state and federal race-based
remedial policies such as affirmative action in state employ-
ment and contracting, and so forth. And Brown inspired other
groups to bring their own challenges to systematic state dis-
crimination against them-not just women, but also nonmari-
tal children and gay people in the 1960s and 1970s, elderly
folks and people in poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, people with
disabilities in the 1980s and 1990s, and others sure to come.
This phenomenon inspired Justice Scalia's charge that
Lawrence would mean the end of all laws regulating public
morals-or at least those that clash with the mores of five Jus-
tices. The following morals laws are now dead, Scalia opined:
laws criminalizing fornication, adultery, incest, obscenity, bes-
tiality, prostitution, and masturbation(!)."'6 This is an old ar-
gument. In the United Kingdom a generation ago, Lord Patrick
Devlin assailed the Wolfenden Report's recommendation that
consensual sodomy be decriminalized with the argument that
one of the chief ends of government is to regulate social moral-
ity.206 His Lordship worried that if consensual sodomy were de-
regulated, there would be no neutral reason not to decriminal-
ize other reprehensible behaviors such as adultery, bestiality,
incest, cockfighting, and fornication. °7
Is Lawrence the end of morals legislation in the United
States? Don't believe it. England did not fall down Lord Dev-
lin's slippery slope after it decriminalized consensual sodomy in
205. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are
"sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices"); id. at 2495 (same charge as to "laws against fornication, bigamy,
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity"); id. at 2496 (same charge as to laws
against adultery, fornication, adult incest, and same-sex marriage).
206. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1968).
207. See id. at 1-25.
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1967,208 and there is no reason the United States will fall down
Scalia's slipperier slope. Lawrence does, however, clarify the
constitutional status of morals laws, and the academic debate
will clarify their status even more. Consider three different, but
complementary, ways of thinking about the Devlin-Scalia criti-
cism.
One response to this criticism is libertarian. A distin-
guished body of moral philosophy maintains that the state can-
not restrict important liberties of its citizens just because other
citizens disapprove of their exercise. The state has no moral or
political authority to restrict such important liberties, except
when their exercise tangibly harms third parties.2 9 Lawrence
might be read to establish such a strong libertarian baseline for
state regulation of sexual activities.2 ' 0 That is a principle that
links Lawrence comfortably with Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. In her commentary on Lawrence, Professor Suzanne Gold-
berg maintains that Supreme Court majorities in the last 100
years have almost never sustained state regulation of morality
without some credible evidence that assertedly immoral con-
duct harmed third parties.'
Indeed, Professor Goldberg's analysis of Lawrence and pre-
vious cases suggests that the Devlin-Scalia criticism is not so
much wrong as it is obsolete-and obsolete before Lord Devlin
208. Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60 (Eng. & Wales).
209. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in PREFACES TO LIBERTY
241 (Bernard Wishy ed., Beacon Press 1959) (1859) (presenting the classic
statement of libertarian philosophy); JEREMY BENTHAM, Paederasty (pts. 1 &
2), reprinted in 3 J. HOMOSEXUALTY 383 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978) and 4 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978) (1785) (arguing against state
regulation of consensual sodomy because it limits the pleasure available to
sodomites without preventing harm to third parties); see also H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (responding to Lord Devlin with a mild
version of Mill's libertarian philosophy); POSNER, supra note 53 (taking a
pragmatic libertarian approach to America's many sex laws).
210, Some of the language of Justice Kennedy's opinion has a whiff of Mill.
E.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (contrasting sodomy between consenting
adults in the home with other conduct having third-party effects-rape, sex
with minors (who cannot consent), public sexual conduct (that would harm
captive audiences)). Randy Barnett reads Lawrence to encode Mill's libertarian
philosophy within the Due Process Clause, a reading disputed by Dale Car-
penter. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002-2003 21, 33-37,
39 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003), with Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertar-
ian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1148-70 (2004).
211. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1261-83 (2004).
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rendered it. The Supreme Court's reasoning in morals-
regulation cases closely tracks Max Weber's famous theory
about what distinguishes a modern society from a premodern
one. 21 What marks the transition from premodern to modern
law and society is a movement from enforcement of status dis-
tinctions through regulation of status-expressing conduct to-
ward instrumentalist regulation of conduct because of its con-
sequences for other people or the public.
For example, one staple of premodern thinking is that it is
very important to reaffirm the different statuses of being male
and being female by adopting legal regulations of nonconform-
ing dress and conduct. So traditionalist societies actually im-
pose legal penalties on women and men who transgress some-
times quite complicated dress rules. Modern society can have
morals legislation just as premodern society can, but it has to
be justified along socially instrumental lines. For example,
American cities and states have traditionally made it a crime to
cross-dress.1 Although originally adopted as expressions of a
biblical or natural law philosophy, these laws were rejustified
and enforced in the twentieth century as a means of policing
deviant behavior by gay men and, especially, lesbians. That in-
strumentalist justification collapsed after Stonewall, and one
jurisdiction after another repealed its cross-dressing laws or
saw them invalidated by courts."'
Although cross-dressing laws have died in modern Amer-
ica, most other morals regulations have survived because they
have been modernized.215 Under premodern premises, a father's
sexual assault on his daughter is wrongful because it violates
212. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 998-1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968). For applications of Weber's ideas, see ROSEMARY PRINGLE,
SECRETARIES TALK 85-89 (Verso 1989) (1988); ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN
AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
213. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 338-41. Cross-dressing
regulations are classic premodern legal forms. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22:5
(stating that cross-dressing is "abhorrent to the Lord").
214. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 27-29, 111, 338-41 (detail-
ing the rise and fall of cross-dressing laws).
215. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of
Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1327 (2000) (showing the modernization and sedimentation of justifica-
tions for antigay status rules); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (arguing that tradi-
tional status categories can survive and even prosper because their justifica-
tions are modernized).
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the natural law (or God's law) rule of no sex outside of mar-
riage. In the modern era, this conduct is even more deeply im-
moral, not because it is contrary to natural law, but rather be-
cause it has catastrophic effects on a particularly vulnerable
third party. Under premodern premises, a husband's adultery
is wrongful because it is a betrayal of the natural law (God's)
institution of marriage. In the modern era, this justification has
taken a back seat to the notion that adultery violates the prom-
ise the husband made to remain faithful to his wedded wife.
Notwithstanding this modernized justification, however, adul-
tery is only a crime in twenty-five states, and usually a misde-
meanor in those jurisdictions. 16
So the list of morals laws that would fall under a strongly
libertarian reading of Lawrence is shorter than Justice Scalia
says. Even bestiality laws might be sustained under a libertar-
ian philosophy. Under my updated Weberian theory, the Court
would eschew or downplay a rationale emphasizing how dis-
gusting sex with animals is to the reasonable American and
would emphasize some instrumental rationale. Some studies
suggest that bestiality is linked to sexual assault on children
and, if believed, that could be a respectable modern rationale.2 7
My point is not that bestiality laws should be upheld (I really
don't care). Rather, it is that such laws can be and would be de-
fended on libertarian grounds that would be admissible even
under Justice Scalia's broad reading of the Lawrence majority.
A second way to respond to Justice Scalia is substantive.
The state can have morals legislation, but it cannot condemn or
criminalize conduct that is deeply moral to many productive
Americans. More than forty years ago, in a pre-Griswold
contraception case, Yale Professor Fowler Harper suggested to
the Supreme Court that sexual pleasure is an important end in
itself, and frustration of one's preferred sexual outlet, by the
216. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 100 & n.i (listing state laws as
of 2003).
217. For studies providing a tentative empirical link between sexual abuse
of animals and sexual assault generally, see William M. Fleming et al., Char-
acteristics of Juvenile Offenders Admitting to Sexual Activity with Nonhuman
Animals, 10 SOC'Y & ANIMALS 31, 36-37 (2002); Robert K. Ressler et al., Mur-
derers Who Rape and Mutilate, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 273, 277-78
(1986). See also Carol J. Adams, Bestiality: The Unmentioned Abuse, THE
ANIMALS' AGENDA Nov./Dec. 1995, at 29 (finding the zoophile's view of the
world is similar to that of the rapist and child abuser); Carol J. Adams, Bring-
ing Peace Home: A Feminist Philosophical Perspective on the Abuse of Women,
Children, and Pet Animals, HYPATIA Spring 1994, at 63 (noting that child
abusers may abuse animals to enhance the abuse of child victims).
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state or otherwise, is psychologically harmful to the individual
as well as the family. 18 "'[While in the lower animals sexual
pleasure is primarily a means to an end, in human beings it is
not only a means to an end but also a very important end in it-
self,"' and suppressing sexual pleasure through a regimen of
continence "'is harmful to the personality'" and even risks emo-
tional turmoil that gives rise to "'pathological expression.' 219
A fundamental feature of the LGBT politics of recognition
is the notion that homosexual intimacy is a human good, mean-
ingful to gay people for the same reasons that penile-vaginal
(and other forms of) intercourse are meaningful to straight
people. 20 I think this proposition is a defensible and indeed cor-
rect corollary to Professor Harper's advice a generation earlier.
But Lawrence does not, and should not be read to, embrace this
excellent moral point. Justice Kennedy's opinion offers Law-
rence and Garner "respect for their private lives"22' and affirms
their freedom to enter into a "personal bond" that entails sex-
ual intercourse. 22 But that is as far as he goes. The theme of
his opinion is tolerance of private homosexual intimacy and not
equivalence of such intimacy with the intimacies of marriage or
even heterosexual intimacies outside of marriage.2
23
Given the current normative equilibrium in the United
States, Justice Kennedy made the right call, one that gay peo-
ple can understand and accept. Middle America can accept that
homosexuality is a tolerable variation from the "norm," namely
heterosexuality. To affirm that norm and render it a constitu-
tional floor lowers the stakes of politics for gay people, who can
no longer be jailed for their private activities or treated as open
218. See Brief for Appellants at 29-31, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(1960 Term, No. 60) (harm of sexual abstinence to the individual); id. at 31-33
(harm to family life).
219. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Karl Menninger, Psychiatric Aspects of Contra-
ception, 7 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 36 (1943)).
220. See CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS 4 (2003) (noting that
the gay rights movement is increasingly seeking societal recognition and sup-
port, and not merely to be left alone); Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,
Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 331-36
(1996) (drawing on this idea as a response to Lord Devlin); see also Sandel, su-
pra note 163, at 534-38 (discussing the substantive claim that homosexual in-
timacy, like heterosexual intimacy, is a good).
221. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
222. Id. at 2478.
223. See id. at 2484 ("The right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives [Lawrence and Garner] the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention by the government.").
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outlaws by the state. To affirm that norm, without seeking to
elevate homosexuality to the same normative level as hetero-
sexuality, is a signal to traditionalists that their core values
and lifestyles should not be threatened.224 The further, and im-
plicit, message of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that it is up to
LGBT people and their normative politics of recognition to
move public opinion from the tolerable variation norm to the
norm that homosexuality is a benign variation (and there is no
single norm for sexual orientation).225
A third way to respond to Justice Scalia is to focus on social
consensus. Courts might evaluate statutes that limit people's
freedom to engage in conduct that they enjoy more leniently if
it appears that most Americans still consider the regulated
conduct morally harmful. Conversely, the same kind of statutes
would fall if it appears that Americans no longer consider the
regulated conduct morally harmful. So the Justices may have
been influenced by objective indications as to how successful
the LGBT rights movement had been in persuading neutral ob-
servers that homosexual sodomy was not such terrible conduct
that it ought to be a crime.226 As Justice Kennedy emphasized,
all but thirteen states had repealed their consensual sodomy
laws by 2003, and courts abroad and even in our nation's most
traditionalist jurisdictions had found consensual sodomy to be a
constitutionally protected liberty.227
Indeed, such a finger-to-gauge-the-winds-of-change ap-
proach suggests a way to reconcile Hardwick and Lawrence. In
1986, when Hardwick was handed down, the political signals
224. The strategy of the dissenting opinion was to announce that, in fact,
the majority was raising the stakes of politics for traditionalists: Today the
"homosexuals" get out of jail; tomorrow they will be legally wed. Id. at 2498
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This charge was wrong as a matter of fact, and it was
unproductive as a matter of the Court's institutional legitimacy. That the
Chief Justice of the United States joined such a provocative dissent is unfor-
tunate. (Contrast Justice Thomas's sober and responsible dissent. Id. at 2498
(Thomas, J., dissenting).)
225. See id. at 2484 ("[Tlimes can blind us to certain truths and later gen-
erations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to express.").
226. In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has relied on state and even
foreign statutory trends toward mercy, as a strong reason to reevaluate the
application of the death penalty to certain classes of defendants. See Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct, 2242, 2248-50 (2002) (considering the application of the
death penalty to mentally disabled defendants); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 826-31 (1988) (juveniles).
227. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-83 (citing cases).
20041 1087
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
were much more mixed. Twenty-four states still had consensual
sodomy laws, as did the District of Columbia.22 8 Indeed, in 1981
the District had repealed its consensual sodomy law as part of a
modernization of its sex crime laws-but the reform had been
assailed by the Reverend Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority and by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Washington, James Hickey.
229
Arguing that the reform law would promote immoral homo-
sexuality, Falwell and Hickey stampeded the U.S. House of
Representatives to veto the District's law by a bipartisan 281-S230
119 vote. Only one state (Wisconsin) deregulated consensual
sodomy in the decade after that House action.231 Thus, the
Hardwick Court might have reasonably believed that there was
a lot of support for consensual sodomy laws in the 1980s-a be-
lief that would not have been reasonable in 2003.
So social movements reemerge as central, to the extent
that they actually change social norms in the country. Laws
against fornication were dead letters before Lawrence. In the
wake of the sexual revolution of the 1960s, most Americans are
sodomites and fornicators as well (many are both). Like consen-
sual sodomy laws, laws against fornication have dried up at the
state level and are almost never enforced against consenting
adults in the privacy of the home. If they were not already un-
constitutional under Eisenstadt, they surely are after Law-
rence.
The foregoing three ways of responding to the Devlin-
Scalia position not only undermine the notion that Lawrence is
the constitutional death of all morals regulations, but also sug-
gest how those regulations should be evaluated. Recall the
three principles at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment that
inform the jurisprudence of tolerance: (1) the rule of law, with
particular attention to the coherence of a policy or law with
228. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986), overruled by Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
229. See 127 CONG. REC. 22,762-63 (statement of Rep. Philip M. Crane)
(reading letter from Archbishop Hickey expressing that the D.C. legislation
"weakened" the "fabric of society"); id. at 22,768 (statement of Rep. McKinney)
(quoting a Washington Post editorial citing Reverend Jerry Falwell as calling
the D.C. act "perverted").
230. Id. at 22,770, 22,778-79 (Oct. 1, 1981) (roll call vote on House Resolu-
tion 208). Among those voting for the Resolution were Representatives Rich-
ard Cheney of Wyoming, Geraldine Ferraro of New York, Richard Gephardt of
Missouri, Newt Gingrich of Georgia, Albert Gore of Tennessee, and Steve
Gunderson of Wisconsin. Id.
231. 1983 Wis. Laws 17 § 5.
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other policies or laws today (and not just the distant past); (2)
the libertarian presumption and the harm principle; and (3) the
rule against class legislation, with particular attention to
whether a social movement has successfully called into ques-
tion a traditional moral rule.
These constitutional principles and responses to Devlin-
Scalia can be synthesized into doctrinal variables-features of
a liberty-infringing policy that render it more or less constitu-
tionally vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. So a
morals law that prohibits conduct that (1) is no longer widely
criminalized and (2) does not seem to impose harm on third
parties but (3) is important to a coherent and well-organized
social group, is most constitutionally objectionable. For the rea-
sons suggested above, fornication easily fits within this unregu-
lable core: Most states have decriminalized it, there is virtually
no evidence of third-party harms, and a whole generation (the
baby boomers) considers the right to fornicate important to
their lives, or formative experiences in their youths. Masturba-
tion is an even easier call from Scalia's list, as it is not a crime
anywhere in the United States, and it does not harm anyone.232
Conversely, laws criminalizing conduct that (1) is still a
crime in a large majority of states, (2) demonstrably harms
third parties or the community, and (3) has not become the fo-
cus of a social movement, are easy calls in the other direction-
the state has substantial freedom to criminalize or regulate.
Most of the items on Scalia's list fall within this category of
currently permissible state regulation: adultery, which violates
a promise of fidelity and often imposes reliance and other costs
on the innocent spouse; public prostitution, which remains uni-
versally regulated and is associated with nuisances of various
sorts; child pornography, which is universally regulated and
has properly been upheld on the ground that participation in it
harms children; and incest involving minors, which is univer-
sally regulated and has not become the focus of a social move-
ment. By the way, since 1900, most morals regulations have
been laws protecting children against a variety of sexual
knowledges and experiences. One may debate the wisdom of
232. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Law, Self-Pollution, and the Management of
Social Anxiety, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 221, 261-89 (2001) (describing the
cultural and legal history of masturbation regulation).
233. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988)
(discussing a Virginia law criminalizing the commercial display of sexually
explicit materials in a manner whereby juveniles could peruse or examine
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this wide array of laws, and many of them have proven vulner-
able under the First Amendment,234 but neither Lawrence nor
the jurisprudence of tolerance poses any constitutional threat
to them.
The hardest calls are some of the adult incest cases, includ-
ing sex between first cousins and siblings by affinity (marriage)
rather than blood. Although adult incest between siblings is
criminal almost everywhere, many states do not include sib-
lings by affinity, and most do not make it a crime for first cous-
ins to have sex.236 If the reported cases are any guide, these
statutes are almost never enforced in cases involving consen-
sual intercourse. The harm of adult incest seems speculative
but plausible: If close relatives (cousins) or people raised to-
gether (siblings by affinity) could engage in sex once they be-
came adults, the family as a sexually "safe" place would be un-
dermined. On the other hand, there are none of the collateral
consequences for adult incestophiles that Lawrence found trou-
bling for homosexual sodomy laws. Additionally, no social
movement has formed to persuade America that adult incest is
okay. In large part because the social and normative stakes of
adult incest among cousins or siblings by affinity are so low,
Lawrence and its (or my) jurisprudence of tolerance do not at
this time require that even these statutes violate the Four-
teenth Amendment.
VI. LAWRENCE AND HOMO EQUALITY
Justice Scalia's slipperiest slope-and his biggest fear-is
that Lawrence now requires the Court, and the nation, to swal-
low the entire "homosexual agenda." 236 That agenda includes
service of openly gay or bisexual Americans in the armed forces
them).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
827 (2000) (holding a statute requiring that television channels "primarily
dedicated to sexually oriented programming" be fully scrambled or blocked
during the day, when children could likely view them, as unnecessarily re-
strictive content-based speech regulation in violation of the First Amendment).
235. See Martha Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Ex-
ample of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21, 26-29 (1993); Brett H.
McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2004)
(post-Lawrence analysis); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harm-
less Incest, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 262 (2000) (arguing that laws denying
the right to marry to adults related by affinity may be constitutionally sus-
pect).
236. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496-97 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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and state recognition of same-sex marriage. I think that the
LGBT rights movement will someday persuade most Americans
that these gay-friendly reforms represent good, and not just
tolerable, public policy. But the Supreme Court in Lawrence did
not create a constitutional regime that goes this far. With due
respect to Justice Scalia's excellent powers of analysis, he is be-
ing more provocative than persuasive in asserting that Law-
rence logically or inferentially requires open gays in the mili-
tary and same-sex marriage.
I would be the first to say that the case for same-sex mar-
riage is a normatively compelling one, as excluding same-sex
couples is a hard-to-justify discrimination. But the case for
same-sex marriage is not one that the jurisprudence of toler-
ance will now impose on all the states as a constitutional mat-
ter. Even if Massachusetts starts issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples in May 2004, the other forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia still limit marriage to one man and
one woman. Thirty-eight states have statutes or constitutional
amendments barring recognition in those states of same-sex
marriages validly entered elsewhere. 39 Most Americans would
be disturbed by recognition of same-sex marriages in their
states, and for many Americans the limitation of marriage to
people of different sexes is at the core of their religious identi-
237. See id.
238. See CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND THE POLITICS
OF THE CLOSET: LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACEMENT 107-15 (2000); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 87-122 (1996); MORRIS B.
KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF
DESIRE 207-38 (1997); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1872,
1930-42 (1997); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People
and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 257-65 (1998).
239. States with same-sex marriage nonrecognition statutes, as of January
2004, are (with the dates of enactment): Alabama (1998), Alaska (1996), Ari-
zona (1996), Arkansas (1997), California (2000), Colorado (2000), Delaware
(1996), Florida (1997), Georgia (1996), Hawaii (1998), Idaho (1996), Illinois
(1996), Indiana (1997), Iowa (1998), Kansas (1996), Kentucky (1998), Louisi-
ana (1999), Maine (1997), Michigan (1996), Minnesota (1997), Mississippi
(1997), Missouri (1996), Montana (1997), Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002),
North Carolina (1996), North Dakota (1997), Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (1996),
Pennsylvania (1996), South Carolina (1996), South Dakota (1996), Tennessee
(1996), Texas (1973), Utah (1995), Virginia (1997), Washington (1998), and
West Virginia (2000). National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Specific Anti-
Same-Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S., at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/
marriagemap.pdf (Jan. 2004). Most of these states also have definition of mar-
riage statutes, usually adopted in the same legislation.
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ties.2 40 Roe was a more compelling case for constitutional inter-
vention on the part of the Supreme Court. My critique that Roe
raised rather than lowered the stakes of politics would apply
with even greater force to a Supreme Court decision requiring
same-sex marriage in 2004.
Does Lawrence then have no implications for LGBT equal-
ity rights? Return one final time to the three goals of the Four-
teenth Amendment, rule of law (coherence), the libertarian pre-
sumption, and the anti-caste principle. These three goals can be
applied to various antigay discriminations through the lens of
tolerance now required by Lawrence. A constitutional right to
same-sex marriage is supported by the anti-caste principle, for
lesbian and gay couples will not be fully equal citizens until
they have the same choices for state recognition of their rela-
tionships that straight couples have. But the state's limitation
of marriage to different-sex couples does not much implicate
the liberty principle. The coherence principle cuts strongly
against same-sex marriage at this time: Not only have the
states traditionally not recognized same-sex unions as mar-
riage, but no state does today, and there are few on the horizon.
So the case for same-sex marriage as a constitutional mat-
ter is powerfully debatable. Under such circumstances, the
politics of tolerance strongly counsels that the Supreme Court
do nothing for the time being. Either rejecting or endorsing the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bars would immediately
raise the stakes of national politics. The reason is that the issue
of same-sex marriage not only remains divisive, but divides in
ways that cut to the core of people's identities.
Under these circumstances, the Court's best strategy is to
leave the matter to the states, the famous laboratories of ex-
perimentation. Indeed, this is the strategy the Court took, with
success, in the right-to-die case, Washington v. Glucksberg.
241
Although the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court rejected any
constitutional right to die, five Justices took the position that
the matter was not ripe for complete resolution and pronounced
themselves open to future claims.242 Meanwhile, the states are
240. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 60-91 (1997).
241. 521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997).
242. Five Justices were open to a "constitutionally cognizable interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death," but felt that it
was premature to decide one way or another in 1997. Id. at 736-38 (O'Connor,
J.); see id. at 738-52 (Stevens, J.), 752-89 (Souter, J.), 789 (Ginsburg, J.), 789-
1092 [Vol 88:1021
JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE
free to recognize a right to die, and the experience from those
states (and from abroad) will provide valuable information for
other states and for the courts in future cases.
Like the right-to-die issue, same-sex marriage is an issue
that would benefit from state experimentation. A great thing
about federalism is that some states are open to gay people's
politics of full recognition: Homosexuality is not just a tolerable
variation, but is benign in the same way that race is-it ought
to make no difference in the state's treatment of a person.
Same-sex marriage has been the testing ground for this propo-
sition. Prompted by a state supreme court decision, Vermont's
legislature debated this issue in 2000 and revealed its popula-
tion to be open to recognition of lesbian and gay unions.243 In
2003, California extended its domestic partnership law to pro-
vide almost all the benefits and obligations of marriage to
same-sex couples. 244 These states were providing something
close to full and equal citizenship for lesbian and gay families,
and they did so through the democratic process. Their experi-
ence will be instructive for other states considering the next
step, one that Massachusetts is prepared to take in May 2004.
So the jurisprudence of tolerance does not give the nation
same-sex marriage, but it does provide strong arguments
against other antigay state discriminations. Consider a few:
1. Criminal Sentencing Discrimination. Kansas's criminal
code makes it a very serious crime for anyone to have oral or
anal sex with a minor who is 14-16 years old;24 punishment for
a first offense is 55-61 months in prison, with a range of 89-
100 months for a second offense and 206-228 months for a
third offense.246 The state has a Romeo and Juliet exception to
92 (Breyer, J.).
243. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 91 (responding to Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY
PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 43-82 (2002) (de-
tailing the Baker litigation and the legislative debates over the civil unions
law).
244. California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003,
ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stats. 2586. Finding that same-sex couples form 'lasting,
committed, and caring relationships," id. § 1(b), the California Legislature ex-
tended almost all the rights, benefits, duties, and obligations of married
spouses to registered domestic partners, id. § 4(a). There is a long transition
period, so that current domestic partners can end their relationships if they do
not welcome the new duties and obligations; the 2003 law goes into effect on
January 1, 2005. Id. § 14.
245. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2) (1995).
246. Id. § 21-3505(c) (severity level 3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (Supp.
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this high level of punishment if the defendant is less than 19
years old, the age difference between the defendant and the
partner is less than four years, the defendant and the partner
are the only parties involved, and the teenagers are of the "op-
posite sex."247 There is no Romeo and Mercutio exception.
Under the Romeo and Juliet exception, punishment for a
first or second offense is presumptively probation; punishment
248'for a third offense is no more than fifteen months in prison.
Eighteen-year-old Matthew Limon performed oral sex on a fif-
teen-year-old male partner in a residential school for develop-
mentally disabled youth. 249 The state stipulated that the oral
sex was consensual but refused Limon the benefit of the Romeo
and Juliet penalties because the partners were of the same250
sex. Limon was sentenced to 206 months (over seventeen
years) in prison, followed by 60 months (five years) of post-
release supervision. 251' A day after Lawrence, the Supreme
Court vacated the Kansas appellate judgments upholding this
sentencing disparity and remanded the case for reconsidera-t. 252
tion.
Although the Kansas Court of Appeals has reaffirmed this
discrimination,2 Lawrence and its associated jurisprudence re-
quire that the sentencing disparity be overturned. The Romeo
and Juliet rule represents a mercy exception to the steep sen-
tences otherwise required for sex with minors. To limit the rule
to heterosexual sodomy is a core violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Like Kansas, a lot of states exempt teenager-
teenager sex from their sex-with-minors laws. Few states, how-
ever, limit their exemptions to straights only. 54 So this is a
novel and still-rare discrimination against gay people. The lib-
erty consequences of the discrimination are significantly worse
than those suffered by Messrs. Lawrence and Garner: They
were in jail for a day; Limon will remain in prison for seventeen
years. This is a steep price to pay for being gay. It is at least as
2002).
247. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (Supp. 2002).
248. Id. § 21-3522(2) (severity level 9); id. § 21-4704.
249. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
250. See id. at 233.
251. Id. at 232.
252. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003).
253. Limon, 83 P.3d at 232.
254. One of the few laws limiting this kind of exemption to teenagers of dif-
ferent sexes is TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(b)(1) (Vernon 2003).
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deep an affront to gay people's equal citizenship as the Texas
Homosexual Sodomy Law was.
Thus, much more than same-sex marriage bars and some-
what more than homosexual sodomy laws, Romeo and Juliet
exceptions are strongly inconsistent with the principles and
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, once that amend-
ment's protections are viewed as applying fully to LGBT people.
Judicial invalidation is warranted, and the jurisprudence of
tolerance strongly suggests that this would be a productive and
parsimonious use of the Court's political capital. These excep-
tions are relatively novel, and it is hard to imagine that even a
fundamentalist Christian would find his identity implicated in
maintaining this discrimination to the same extent that his
identity is implicated in maintaining the same-sex marriage
bar. The Court would not be raising the stakes of politics in the
least by striking down the discrimination in Limon, and it
would confirm the message of Lawrence in the context of teen
sexuality.
2. Antigay Presumptions in Child Custody Cases. After she
came out of the closet as an open lesbian, R.W. divorced her
husband, D.W.W., in 1996. The divorce was acrimonious. The
husband won custody of the couple's two minor children, and
the Alabama trial judge restricted the mother's visitation to
every other weekend and to the maternal grandparents' home
under their supervision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
this humiliating order in Ex parte D.W.W.255 One justification
for the custody order was the trial judge's finding that R.W.
was a bad mother. She and her partner were "active in the ho-
mosexual community," went to gay bars and a "homosexual
church," and "openly display affection in the children's pres-
ence."256 The judge also found that after R.W. commenced co-
habitation with her female partner, the children "began using
inappropriate and vulgar language and required psychiatric
counseling." 25 The daughter started to lie and manipulate oth-
ers.25 8 Chief Justice Moore reasoned further:
Even without this evidence that the children have been adversely af-
fected by their mother's relationship, the trial court would have been
justified in restricting R.W.'s visitation, in order to limit the children's
exposure to their mother's lesbian lifestyle.... Restrictions such as
255. 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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those at issue here are common tools used to shield a child from the
harmful effects of a parent's illicit sexual relationships-heterosexual
or homosexual. Moreover, the conduct inherent in lesbianism is illegal
in Alabama. R.W., therefore, is continually engaging in conduct that
violates the criminal law of this state. Exposing the children to such a
lifestyle, one that is illegal under the laws of this state and immoral
in the eyes of most of its citizens, could greatly traumatize them.
2 9
Clearly, the reasoning and, probably, the judgment in
D.W.W. cannot survive Lawrence. The invocation of the Ala-
bama sodomy law to punish the lesbian mother is the kind of
collateral effect that both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
found troubling in Lawrence.26 ° One effect of Lawrence will be to
press state judges away from sweeping antigay rhetoric such as
that in D. W. W., but many judges will nonetheless discriminate
against lesbian parents. Post-Lawrence, their justification will
have to rest upon findings that the lesbian parent is a bad
mother. In D.W.W., however, there was strong evidence that
the lesbian was a pretty good mother, and a much better parent
than the straight father. Dissenting justices in D.W.W. noted
the "serious alcohol abuse and violence" of the father. 61 Among
other escapades, the father totaled his car while driving drunk
with his daughter in the car unrestrained by a safety belt, was
charged on several occasions with domestic abuse, once closed
his infant son in a clothes dryer, threatened to kill R.W. and
the children, and was in financial default for some obligations
toward his children. 62 The dissenting justices also charged that
the majority ignored evidence that the children had excelled in
school over the year and a half they were in their mother's cus-
tody, and that the mother's partner, a child guidance counselor,
had spent many hours working with the daughter to improve
her skills and learning abilities.263
Denying a lesbian mother custody over or, especially, visi-
tation with her own children because of her sexual orientation
is another core violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
comply faithfully with that amendment, trial judges must focus
on the best interests of the particular child, without any pre-
259. Id. (citations omitted).
260. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (referring to antigay discrimination flowing from
the Texas sodomy law in the fields of employment and family law); cf. id. at
2482 (opinion of the Court) (discussing generally the collateral consequences
flowing from the sodomy law).
261. D.W.W., 717 So. 2d at 797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 797-98.
263. Id. at 798.
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sumption based on sexual orientation. One hopes that the Su-
preme Court will not have to take cases to enforce this obvious
corollary of Lawrence. Most states have abandoned strong pre-
sumptions against custody by LGBT parents, and even states
in the South (the most traditionalist region) have been moving
in that direction. 64 This issue is one best left to state courts for
the time being, with the assumption that they will internalize
the lessons of Lawrence. If they do not, then the Supreme Court
should intervene to protect the interests of children and their
gay parents.
A harder issue is whether a trial judge can consider poten-
tial harms to the child based upon community negativity to-
ward his lesbian or gay parent. This is not a permissible con-
sideration when the negativity is racist in nature,26 ' and in my
view should ultimately not be a permissible consideration when
homophobia is the source of the negativity. The jurisprudence
of tolerance, however, would counsel against the Supreme
Court reaching out aggressively on this issue. This is precisely
the sort of issue that should be left to state courts to flesh out
and debate for the time being, and state judges all over the
country are increasingly willing and capable of handling these
custody disputes in a neutral way.266
3. Employment Discriminations. Also questionable in the
wake of Lawrence would be state and local government policies
or practices discriminating against employing LGBT people as
264. For examples where southern appeals courts have overturned trial
judge denials of custody or even restrictive visitations based, explicitly or in-
ferentially, on a parent's bisexual or homosexual orientation, see Taylor v.
Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 739-40 (Ark. 2003), Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d
1292, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 8-9 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996); Fulk v. Fulk, 827 So. 2d 736, 742 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); McDonald
v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). See also In re Par-
sons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 894-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding trial court's
decision to grant custody to a mother living with her partner).
265. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (overturning a Florida
court's custody decision to remove a child from a racially mixed household).
266. In Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), for ex-
ample, a Florida appeals court overturned a trial court order denying custody
to a lesbian mother. The appellate court ruled that in order for a parent's sex-
ual orientation to influence the custody decision, it must be shown that her
conduct had "a direct effect or impact upon the children." Id. at 413. Citing
and quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the appeals court held
that the trial court's reliance upon social stigma or societal prejudice in de-
termining the best interests of the child was unfounded and inappropriate, be-
cause "the law cannot give effect to private biases." Id. (citing Palmore, 466
U.S. at 433).
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civil servants, police officers, and teachers. Some of these cases
would be closer calls than the earlier examples. Consider Sha-
har v. Bowers.267
The Georgia Attorney General's office offered a job to Robin
Brown, a top graduate of the Emory Law School. 268 Although
she had indicated on her application form that she was plan-
ning to marry another woman, this detail did not come to the
attention of Attorney General Michael Bowers (yes, the same
guy) until after the offer of employment was made.269 After her
wedding, and her change of name to Robin Shahar, Bowers
withdrew the offer, based only upon the "purported marriage
between you and another woman. As the chief legal officer of
this state inaction on my part would constitute tacit approval of
this purported marriage and jeopardize the proper functioning
of this office."27° Shahar filed a constitutional lawsuit. Bowers
defended his action on two grounds: the Supreme Court's
precedents gave him a wide discretion to choose personnel who
fit well with the needs of his office, and Hardwick provided a
more than sufficient reason why a law enforcement office could
not hire an openly lesbian attorney.
271
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the discrimi-
nation. Dissenting judges argued that the discrimination was
based solely on Shahar's sexual orientation (or, in the alterna-
tive, her protected First Amendment expression of her com-
mitment to another woman) and therefore reflected the same
kind of antigay "animus" that had been fatal in Romer.272 Invok-
ing Hardwick as important background context, the majority
responded that it was reasonable for the Attorney General to
interpret Shahar's same-sex marriage:
[Als having a realistic likelihood to affect her (and, therefore, the De-
partment's) credibility, to interfere with the Department's ability to
handle certain kinds of controversial matters (such as claims to same
sex marriage licenses, homosexual parental rights, employee benefits,
insurance coverage of "domestic partners"), to interfere with the De-
partment's efforts to enforce Georgia's laws against homosexual sod-
omy, and to create other difficulties within the Department which
267. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049
(1998).
268. Id. at 1100.
269. Id. at 1100-01.
270. Id. at 1101.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1125 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); id. at 1126-27 (Birch, J., dissent-
ing).
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would be likely to harm the public perception of the Department.2 3
Unlike Limon and D. W. W., the role of Bowers v. Hardwick
in supporting this discrimination is less direct. Neither the At-
torney General nor the court said that Shahar was disqualified
because she was a presumptive criminal. Instead, both said
that she was disqualified because the public would lose confi-
dence in the state's chief law enforcement office if it were
widely known that an open lesbian was an employee there. 74
Shahar is a harder case than the earlier ones because the state
is not invading Shahar's liberty as deeply and because of the
public context, where federal courts defer to judgments of state
officials. So there are good arguments for allowing the dis-
crimination, even after Lawrence.
On the other hand, now that Georgia can no longer con-
sider Robin Shahar a presumptive criminal, is it legitimate for
the state to penalize her because some of its citizens continue to
do so? Could the Attorney General have denied Shahar a job
based upon his perception that the people of Georgia would lose
confidence in an office staffed with Jews? Surely not. One
might say, with Justice White, that antigay sentiment is more
pervasive in Georgia than anti-Semitism, but I am dubious.
Georgia was the situs for the most violent anti-Semitic incident
in the United States of the twentieth century, the lynching of
Leo Frank by a bigoted mob,275 and my relatives in Atlanta re-
port that anti-Semitic sentiments are still openly expressed in
country clubs and boardrooms of that state. Also, the antiho-
mosexual views Justice White attributed to Georgians were
surely overstated. When the Georgia Supreme Court struck
down its consensual sodomy law as a violation of the state con-
stitution in 1998, there was scarcely a ripple of protests from
traditionalists .76
Shahar remains a close case. I find more merit in the dis-
senters' approach, and Lawrence certainly provides them with
additional support. In 1998, the Supreme Court denied Sha-
har's petition for certiorari, which I think was the best ap-
proach. For now, the issue of job discrimination, especially in
law enforcement and education, is best handled by state courts
and federal circuit courts applying Romer and Lawrence. In my
273. Id. at 1105 (majority opinion).
274. Id. at 1101.
275. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); ROBERT
SEITZ FREY & NANCY THOMPSON-FREY, THE SILENT AND THE DAMNED (1988).
276. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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view, there is an emerging consensus that sexual orientation
ought not be a relevant job criterion for either state or private
employment. Once (or if) that consensus becomes clearer, the
Supreme Court would then be well advised to settle the matter
in favor of the antidiscrimination norm.
Constitutional Vulnerability of Specific Antigay Policies, USA, 2004
Rule Raising
Against the
Rule of Law Class Stakes Status under
(Novelty and Libertarian Legisla- of the U.S.
Policy Coherence) Presumption tion Politics? Constitution
Antidiscrimi- Cuts Cuts against Cuts for Cuts Unconstitu-
nation Law against against tional (Dale)
Applied to a constitu-
TFV Ass'n tionality
Romeo and Cuts Cuts against Cuts Cuts Unconstitu-
Juliet against against against tional
Exemption (Limon)
from Sex
with Minors
Criminal Law
Presumption Cuts Depends on Cuts Cuts Unconstitu-
Against Child against how court against weakly tional
Custody by views best against (D. W. W.)
LGBT interests of
Parents child
State Weakly Weakly Cuts Cuts Moving
Employment cuts for cuts for against both toward
Discrimina- ways for Unconsitu-
tions some tional
jobs in (Shahar)
some
states
Don't Ask, Weakly Depends Cuts Cuts for Not vulner-
Don't Tell cuts for on how against able now
Military intrusively (Leave to
Policy enforced Political
Process)
Same-Sex Cuts for Cuts both Cuts Cuts for Not vulner-
Marriage Bar ways, but both able now
generally for ways, (Leave to
but States)
increas-
ingly
against
The table on this page sums up the implications of Law-
rence and its jurisprudence of tolerance for the most important
remaining discriminations against LGBT people. The table's
conclusions are provisional because several of the variables are
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dynamic-they will change over time. Most obviously dynamic
is the horizontal coherence feature of the rule of law: A policy
coherent with other policies in the same and other jurisdictions
today may not be coherent twenty years from now. For exam-
ple, Hardwick was decided in a more defensible context for al-
lowing consensual sodomy laws than Lawrence because half the
states and the District of Columbia still had such laws in 1986,
while at most fourteen states did in 2003.
The libertarian assumption contains a less obvious dy-
namic component: Whether there are third-party harms often
depends critically on changing social understandings of the
world. A generation ago, most Americans believed that "homo-
sexuals" were more likely to molest children than heterosexu-
als. 77 In that social context, judges would inevitably be skepti-
cal of leaving custody of children with lesbian or gay parents,
because custody might be harmful to children. Traditionalists
still trot out this justification for opposing such custody,278 but
social scientists have shown it to be a complete canard.279
The most dynamic element of the table is, of course, the
judgment about whether Supreme Court intervention setting a
constitutional floor will lower or raise the stakes of politics in
the LGBT/TFV culture clash. In America today, an authorita-
tive judicial decision either requiring or rebuffing same-sex
marriage would raise the stakes of such politics, and that alone
is reason for the Court to avoid decision. Twenty years from
now, if public opinion has become more accepting of gay people
277. See, e.g., ALBERT D. KLASSEN ET AL., SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S.:
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE 178
tbl.7-7 (Hubert J. O'Gorman ed., 1989) (synthesizing a 1970 public opinion poll
finding that over 70% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree with the
statements that "[h]omosexuals try to play sexually with children if they can-
not get a partner" and that "[homosexuals are dangerous as teachers or youth
leaders, because they try to get sexually involved with children").
278. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting
on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 865-66 & 866 n.180. But see Carlos A.
Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and
Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (collecting social science
data that refute Professor Wardle's assertion that LGBT parents are more
prone to molest their children than straight parents).
279. Straight males are the group most likely to molest children; the
groups least likely to abuse them are lesbians and straight women; gay men
fall somewhere in between, but openly gay men are also lowest risk in this re-
gard. Cf Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homo-
sexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 41 (1994) (describing results from a study of the
medical records of abused children indicating that the children were unlikely
to have been abused by homosexuals).
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and the consensus norm is that homosexuality and heterosexu-
ality are both benign traits, then same-sex marriage will be a
constitutional given. So long as the country is not only in-
tensely divided on the issue, but also divided along identity-
constituting lines, this is not an issue the judiciary can resolve.
That same-sex marriage is irresolvable by the U.S. Su-
preme Court does not mean that state supreme courts cannot
address it. The key variable is how much (if any) normative
progress the LGBT rights movement has made in that jurisdic-
tion. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,2 0 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested that its
citizens had reached that point. By postponing the effect of its
judgment for six months, the Court invited those citizens to
think about same-sex marriage and engage their legislators in
that debate. As a law professor, I have no useful judgment as to
whether the court's perception was accurate, but its approach
was procedurally correct. My one prediction is that when same-
sex marriage comes to Massachusetts, it will not be the
Armageddon that opponents fear, nor will it be the great social
upheaval that many proponents espouse. The reason is that by
that time it will be clear that local norms have accommodated
the complete equal citizenship of LGBT people.
280. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating the same-sex marriage bar
under the Massachusetts Constitution but postponing the effect of the judg-
ment for 180 days so that the legislature can take appropriate action).
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